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Abstract
We present a new approach to deal with default information based on the theory of belief functions.
Our semantic structures, inspired by Adams’ epsilon semantics, are epsilon-belief assignments,
where mass values are either close to 0 or close to 1. In the first part of this paper, we show
that these structures can be used to give a uniform semantics to several popular non-monotonic
systems, including Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor’s system P , Pearl’s system Z, Brewka’s preferred
subtheories, Geffner’s conditional entailment, Pinkas’ penalty logic, possibilistic logic and the
lexicographic approach. In the second part, we use epsilon-belief assignments to build a new system,
called LCD, and show that this system correctly addresses the well-known problems of specificity,
irrelevance, blocking of inheritance, ambiguity, and redundancy. Ó 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All
rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Default reasoning is a form of non-monotonic reasoning (NMR) that consists in drawing
conclusions from (i) a set of general rules which may have exceptions (like “birds fly”),
and (ii) a set of facts representing the available information (which is often incomplete).
The conclusions so drawn are only plausible, and they can be subsequently revised in the
light of new information. In the canonical penguin example, if we know that Tweety is
I A preliminary short version of this paper appeared in the Proceedings of the Conference on Uncertainty in
Artificial Intelligence, Montreal, Quebec, 1995, pp. 19–26.
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a bird, then we can conclude that it flies. If we later learn that it is a penguin, however,
we should withdraw this conclusion. Similar problems are encountered in diagnostic
settings (e.g., [18]). The desirable properties for a consequence relation that capture default
reasoning have been discussed at length in the AI literature. They can be summarized as
follows.
• Rationality: The consequence operator used to generate plausible conclusions from a
knowledge base should satisfy the rationality postulates proposed by Kraus et al. [31]
(see Section 2.1).
• Specificity: Results obtained from more specific classes should override those
obtained from more generic ones [60]. For example, from the default base ∆ =
{“Birds fly”, “Penguins do not fly”, “Penguins are birds”}, one should deduce that
Tweety, who is both a penguin and a bird, does not fly, since penguins are a subclass
of birds.
• Irrelevance: If a formula δ is a plausible consequence of α, and if a formula β is
“irrelevant” to the problem, then δ should also be a plausible consequence of α ∧ β .
For example, given the default rule “birds fly”, we should also deduce that “red birds
fly” since being red is irrelevant to the property of flying, meaning that no conditional
assertion in the default base deals with red things. This intuitive notion of being
“irrelevant” is not precisely defined in the NMR literature—in fact, the very use of
the word “irrelevant” here may be criticized. In this paper, we consider a narrow
definition of irrelevance, and say that a formula β is irrelevant to a default base ∆ if
β is composed of propositional symbols that do not appear in ∆.
• Property inheritance: A subclass that is exceptional with respect to some property
should still inherit the other properties from super-classes, unless there is a
contradiction. For example, from the default base ∆ above plus the rule “Birds have
legs”, one should deduce that penguins have legs too, since having legs is not a
conflicting property—the only conflicting property is flying. Failure to perform these
deductions is referred to as the problem of inheritance blocking.
• Ambiguity preservation: In a situation where we have an argument in favor of a
proposition, and an independent argument in favor of its negation, we should not
conclude anything about that proposition. The most popular example is the so-called
Nixon diamond: knowing that Quakers are pacifists, that Republicans are not pacifists,
and that Nixon is both a Quaker and a Republican, one should not deduce that Nixon
is a pacifist, nor that he is not. 1
• Syntax independence: The consequences of a knowledge base should not depend on
the syntactical form used to represent the available knowledge. In particular, they
should not be sensitive to duplications of rules in the knowledge base; failure to do
this is referred to as the problem of redundancy.
Since Reiter’s paper [43], many proposals for reasoning with default information have
appeared in the literature. Some of them are based on the use of uncertainty models such as
probability theory [2,39], or possibility theory [6,14]. Up to now, however, no single system
1 Note that this is different from the situation in which the same argument supports both a conclusion and its
contrary. For example, given the rules “α→ β” and “α→¬β”, the argument α supports both β and its contrary
¬β. In the latter case, we are in the presence of inconsistency.
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has been reported that fulfills all of the desiderata above. In this paper, we show how we
can use belief functions, originally developed for modeling uncertainty [47,49,56], to build
a non-monotonic system that gives a satisfactory answer to all of the above issues.
There have already been a few works on representing default information with belief
functions, e.g., [26,55]. These works require the assessment of numerical values, whose
origin is often an open question. Finding a representation free from such assessments
would somehow avoid the problem of the origin of the numbers. The representation that
we develop in this paper addresses this problem. Our starting point is an interpretation
of default information that uses a class of infinitesimal belief functions, called ε-belief
functions, whose non-null masses are either infinitesimally close to 0 or to 1.
The idea of using extreme values is not new in plausible reasoning. For instance, Adams
[2] uses extreme probabilities to encode default information; de Kleer [18] and Poole [41]
apply extreme probabilities to diagnostics problems; and Wilson [64] represents default
rules by limits of belief functions. In this paper, we show that Adams’ results for reasoning
with default information based on probability functions can also be obtained with belief
functions. Thanks to the greater expressive power and the greater flexibility of belief
functions, we are able to build a powerful framework that can be specialized to capture any
one of several existing systems. In particular, this framework encompasses Adams’ system,
the P system, the Z system, the possibilistic logic, the penalty logic, the lexicographic
approach, Geffner’s conditional entailment, and Brewka’s preferred subtheories. Moreover,
we propose a new system based on this framework, called LCD, which is different from all
these existing systems. LCD correctly addresses the problems of specificity, of irrelevance,
of inheritance blocking, of ambiguity, and of redundancy, that are encountered among the
other systems.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section fixes the notation,
recalls a few notions of the theory of belief functions, and reviews Adams’ ε-semantics.
In Section 3, we introduce ε-belief functions, and show how to use them to define a non-
monotonic consequence relation that is equivalent to Adams’ ε-semantics. This relation
turns out to be too cautious given our desiderata, and we devote the rest of the paper
to study ways to strengthen it. In Section 4, we use the least-commitment principle, and
obtain a system equivalent to Pearl’s system Z. In Section 5, we use Dempster’s rule of
combination, and obtain a family of systems that includes systems equivalent to several
popular non-monotonic systems. These results are important, because they show that ε-
belief functions provide a general framework for default reasoning that captures several
existing systems (and possibly others) as particular cases. Each system is obtained by
imposing certain constraints over the ε-belief functions. In Section 6, we study the system
obtained when these constraints come from two general principles: least commitment and
auto-deduction. We call LCD this new system. In Section 7, we analyze the behavior
of LCD, and show that it correctly addresses the problems of specificity, of irrelevance,
of inheritance blocking, of ambiguity, and of redundancy. Section 8 is devoted to a
comparison of LCD with other popular systems; we show that LCD is strictly stronger
than Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor’s system P , but it is incomparable with all of the
major extensions of P currently found in the literature. Section 9 contains some final
remarks and suggestions for future work. More technical details are collected in two
appendices.
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2. Background
2.1. Default reasoning
We are interested in representing default rules (or, simply, defaults) of the form
normally, if we have α, then β is the case, (1)
where α and β are formulae of some underlying language L. In this paper, we
assume that L is a classical propositional language constructed from a finite set V of
propositional symbols (denoted by lower case letters p,q, r, . . .) and the usual connectives
∧ (conjunction),∨ (disjunction), and ¬ (negation). The elements of L, or formulae, will be
denoted by Greek letters α,β, δ, . . . . An interpretation for L is an assignment of a truth-
value in {T,F} to each formula of L in accordance with the classical rules of propositional
calculus; we denote by Ω the set of all such interpretations (also called worlds). We say
that a world ω satisfies a formula α, and write ω |= α, iff α is true in ω. We denote by [α]Ω
the set of all the worlds in Ω that satisfy α. Throughout this paper, we shall normally work
with objects of the type [α] (where Ω is fixed and understood), and identify [α] with the
proposition denoted by the formula α. We sometimes use α as a shortcut for [α] when the
context prevents any ambiguity. Finally, we say that α entails p, and write α |= β iff all the
worlds that satisfy α also satisfy β , i.e., [α] ⊆ [β].
We write the default rule (1) as α→ β , where α and β are formulae of L. Note that “→”
is a non-classical arrow, and it should not be confused with material implication. Given a
default d = α→ β , we denote by φd the formula of L obtained by replacing→ by the
material implication, that is, φd =¬α ∨ β . If E is a set of defaults, we let φE =∧d∈E φd .
A default base is a multiset ∆= {αi→ βi, i = 1, . . . , n} of defaults. We emphasize that a
default base is a multiset rather than a set, i.e., {α→ β} is different from {α→ β, α→ β}.
A default base can contain defaults that hint at opposite conclusions given the same
premise. For example, consider the base ∆ = {b→ f, p→ b, p→ ¬f } (where “b”
stands for “bird”, “f ” for “flies”, and “p” for “penguin”); given the fact b ∧ p, the
first default supports the conclusion “f ”, while the third one supports “¬f ”—in fact,
the formula φ∆ ∧ (b ∧ p) is classically inconsistent. We say that the defaults in ∆ are
conflicting. If the formula φ∆ is itself inconsistent, we say that∆ is classically inconsistent.
In general, no non-trivial result can be derived from a classically inconsistent default base.
We use default bases to represent background knowledge about what is normally the
case. Given a base ∆, we are interested in defining a consequence relation |∼∆ between
formulae of L that tells us which consequences we can “reasonably” draw from given
facts, given the background knowledge ∆. Our goal is to define |∼∆ so that it fulfills
the desiderata listed in the Introduction. For example, given the base ∆ above, we would
like to have b |∼f and b ∧ p |∼¬f , but not b ∧ p |∼f (we omit the ∆ subscript when
this is clear from the context). This example shows that |∼ should be non-monotonic;
other desirable formal properties for the |∼ consequence relation have been discussed, for
instance, by Gabbay [19], Kraus et al. [31], Lehmann and Magidor [35] and Gärdenfors
and Makinson [20].
In particular, Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor [31] have proposed a set of postulates,
known as the KLM postulates, that are commonly regarded as the minimal core of any
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“reasonable” non-monotonic system, and defined a non-monotonic system, called P (for
“Preferential”), based on the following six postulates:
1. Reflexivity: α |∼α
2. Left Logical Equivalence (LLE): from α |= α′, α′ |= α and α |∼β deduce α′ |∼β
3. Right Weakening (RW): from β |= β ′ and α |∼β deduce α |∼β ′
4. OR: from α |∼γ and β |∼γ deduce α ∨ β |∼γ
5. Cautious Monotony (CM): from α |∼β and α |∼γ deduce α ∧ β |∼γ
6. Cut: from α ∧ β |∼γ and α |∼β deduce α |∼γ
From these rules, a consequence relation |∼P can be defined for any given∆ by: φ |∼P ψ
if and only if φ |∼ψ can be derived from ∆ using the rules of system P . Unfortunately,
system P turned out to be too weak to be satisfactory: for instance, it suffers from the above
mentioned problems of irrelevance and of inheritance blocking: in the bird and penguin
example, P cannot deduce that a given red bird flies, and it cannot deduce that penguins
have legs.
2.2. Probabilistic semantics for default rules
Adams [1,2], and later Pearl [39] and Lehmann and Magidor [35], have suggested a
probabilistic interpretation where a default rule α→ β is read as the constraint P(β|α) >
1 − ε, with P a probability distribution over Ω . 2 Given a set of defaults ∆ and a given
ε, they construct a class of probability distributions Aε such that, for each distribution
P in Aε and each default αi → βi in ∆, P(βi |αi) > 1 − ε (recall that we write α as an
abbreviation for [α]). When Aε is empty, the default base ∆ is inconsistent. For example,
∆= {α→ β, α→¬β} is inconsistent. Note that if ∆ is classically inconsistent, it is also
inconsistent. In the main part of this paper, we only deal with consistent default bases.
In that case, a formula β is said to be an ε-consequence of α with respect to ∆, denoted
by α |∼ε β , if for each P ∈ Aε there exists a real function O such that limε→0O(ε) = 0
and P(β|α) > 1 − O(ε). Said differently, β is a consequence of α with respect to ∆ if
the conditional probability P(β|α) is very high provided that, for each default αi → βi in
∆, P(βi |αi) is very high. Parsons and Bourne [38] and Gilio [22] have computed optimal
bounds associated with proofs for default consequences of system P . Adams and Pearl
interpret ε as a quantity that can be arbitrary small, while Lehmann and Magidor interpret
it as an infinitesimal positive number. In Section 2.4, we give a formal definition of the
infinitesimals used in this paper. In general, probabilistic semantics for default rules are
based on probability values that are either close to 0 or close to 1. Pearl [39] and Dubois
and Prade [14] have shown that if we allow arbitrary (not necessarily extreme) values, then
the corresponding consequence relation does not satisfy the rationality postulates defined
by Kraus et al. [31]. Alternative probabilistic semantics for system P have been proposed
in [46,58], and standard probabilistic semantics for system P has been proposed in [7].
2 Interestingly, Dubois and Prade [15] pointed out the similarity between a default rule α → β and the
conditional object β|α, which can be seen as a symbolic counterpart to the conditional probability P(β|α).
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Lehmann and Magidor [35] have shown that ε-consequence is equivalent to system P . 3
This means that Adams’ construction gives a (probability-based) semantics for P ;
unfortunately, this also means that this construction suffers from the same problems as
P , namely, irrelevance and inheritance blocking.
2.3. Belief functions
The semantics for default reasoning that we develop in this paper is based on the
formalism of belief functions. In order to make this paper self-contained, we recall here
the basic definitions. For a more complete exposition, we refer the reader to [30,47,49,54,
56].
Let Ω be a finite set of worlds, one of them being the actual world. A (normal 4) basic




The term m(A), called the basic belief mass given to A⊆Ω , represents the part of a total
and finite amount of belief that supports the fact that the actual world belongs to A and
does not support the fact that the actual world belongs to a strict subset of A. Any subset
A of Ω for which m(A) > 0 is called a focal element.
An agent’s belief can be equivalently represented by the function bel : 2Ω → [0,1],





The relation between m and bel is one-to-one. The term bel(A) represents the degree of
belief, or necessary support, that the actual world belongs to A. It contains those parts of
beliefs given to propositions that entail A. Related to bel is the function pl : 2Ω → [0,1],





The term pl(A) quantifies the degree of plausibility, of potential support, that the actual
world belongs to A. It contains those parts of beliefs given to propositions that do not
contradict A. Note that
pl(A)= 1− bel(Ac),
where Ac denotes the set-theoretic complement of A with respect to Ω .
3 The equivalence holds only for consistent default bases. In the case of inconsistencies, Adams has also
considered a further rule “from α |∼⊥ infer β |∼ δ” (which cannot be recovered from system P ). In our paper,
we have only considered finite and consistent default bases and hence the technical differences between Adams
proposal and Lehmann’s framework (concerning the handling of inconsistent default bases) disappear.
4 In the transferable belief model [56], belief functions and plausibility functions are not necessarily normalized,
i.e., we can have m(∅) > 0. Normalization is assumed here as we will only study ratios between bel(B|A) and
bel(Ω|A), which corresponds to studying normalized belief functions.
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It is important to emphasize that our approach is based on the transferable belief model
[52], and not on upper and lower probabilities [61]. Accordingly, the term bel(A) should
be read as the belief given by the agent to the fact that the actual world belongs to A, and
not as the lower envelop of a family of probability functions representing the agent’s belief
about which world is the actual world.
If all the focal elements of a basic belief assignment are singletons, then bel is a
probability measure, and bel = pl. If the focal elements A1, . . . ,An are nested (that is,
A1 ⊆ · · · ⊆An), bel is called a consonant belief function; in which case, for all A,B ⊆Ω ,
bel(A∩B)=min(bel(A),bel(B)) and
pl(A∪B)=max(pl(A),pl(B)).
In this case, bel is a necessity measure and pl is a possibility measure [14,66]. If m has at
most one focal element A 6=Ω,A 6= ∅, i.e.,
m(A)= s, m(Ω)= 1− s, m (elsewhere)= 0, s ∈ [0,1],
then its related belief function is called a simple support function.
Belief functions can be partially ordered by their strength. Let bel1 and bel2 be two
belief functions over Ω . We say that bel1 is less committed than bel2 (or bel2 dominates
bel1 where ‘dominating’ means ‘more informative’) iff, for all A ⊆ Ω , pl1(A) > pl2(A)
with at least one strict inequality. When m1(∅) = m2(∅) = 0, as required in this paper,
this definition is equivalent to bel1(A) 6 bel2(A) for all A ⊆ Ω with at least one strict
inequality. Intuitively, bel1 poses less stringent constraints than bel2 on which world could
be the actual one. The vacuous belief function, defined by the basic belief massesm(Ω)= 1
and m(A)= 0 for all A 6=Ω , is the least committed of all the belief functions on Ω .
Given a family B of belief functions, we define the least committed set ΛB as those
belief functions in B that are not dominating another belief function in B:
ΛB = {bel: bel ∈ B, 6 ∃bel′ ∈ B, bel′ less committed than bel}.
The theory of belief functions provides mechanisms to account for the dynamics of
belief states, that is, the way belief states are modified in the light of evidence. Let E be
a piece of evidence that bears on Ω . The impact of E is represented by a belief function
that describes the agent’s beliefs on Ω given E (and nothing else). Suppose that the agent
receives two distinct pieces of evidence E1 and E2, and let bel1 and bel2 be the induced
belief functions. The combined effect of the two pieces of evidence is represented by the
belief function bel1⊕bel2 obtained by Dempster’s rule of combination, and described by











The c factor is called the normalization factor. Note that the ⊕ operator is commutative
and associative, so the order in which we combine pieces of evidence is irrelevant.
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When a new piece of evidence telling that the actual world belongs to A becomes
available to the agent, his/her belief is revised by the application of the so-called
Dempster’s rule of conditioning. The basic belief mass m(X) that was specifically
supporting the subset X of Ω , now supports X ∩ A. This transfer of belief masses is
described by the following relation, where bel(.|A) and pl(.|A) denote the conditional







A formal justification of both Dempster’s rule of combination and Dempster’s rule of
conditioning can be found in [29,52,53]. Distinctness is defined in [51].
2.4. Infinitesimals and the induced negligibility relation
In this work, we consider “extreme” belief functions which values are “infinitesimally
close” to 0 or to 1, much in the spirit of Adams’ system. Before we embark in the
description of these belief functions, we need to give precise meaning to the expression
“infinitesimally close to 0 or to 1”. The study of such expressions is the object of non-
standard analysis: we address the reader to [27,37,45] for some foundational work; and
to [35,62,65] for applications to probability theory. For the limited goals of this paper,
however, we do not need a full theory of non-standard analysis. In what follows, we outline
the elements that we need in order to precisely define the class of belief functions that we
are interested in. Our treatment is grounded in standard analysis; technical details are given
in Appendix A.
We define first the order of a function and the concept of an infinitesimal as used in this
paper.
Definition 1. Let f be a continuous function from R to R. A nonnegative integer k is
called the order of f , denoted κ(f ), if and only if limη→0 f (η)/ηk ∈ R− {0} when such
a limit exists.
If there is a k that satisfies the previous definition, then this k is unique (to see this, note
that the above limit is infinite for any n > k, and it is zero for any n < k). If there is no
such k, we say that the order of f is undefined. We also extend the notion of order to real
constants c ∈ R by postulating: κ(c)= 0 if c 6= 0; and κ(0)=∞ (addition, minimum and
exponentiation are extended in order to include infinity in the obvious way).
Definition 2. An infinitesimal ε is a real continuous function from (0,1) to (0,1) such
that:
(1) limη→0 ε(η)= 0,
(2) the order κ(ε) is defined.
We limit ourselves to the infinitesimals with limited domains and ranges and that admit
an order, which is a positive integer, since these provide all we need in this paper. Our
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definition of κ(ε) fits with the intuitive idea that the larger the order of ε, the ‘closer’ ε is
to 0 in the neighborhood of 0.
We denote by E0 the set of all infinitesimals so defined.
We then define E1 = {1 − ε | ε ∈ E0}. Intuitively, E1 contains elements which are
infinitesimally close to 1, i.e., for any t ∈ E1, limη→0 t (η)= 1. Finally, we define the set E
by
E= E0 ∪E1 ∪ {0} ∪ {1}.
By construction, the elements of E are functions t of η whose value tends to either 0 (for
t ∈ E0) or to 1 (for t ∈ E1) as η tends to 0, plus the 0 and 1 constants. These are the objects
that we shall use as values for our extreme belief functions.
Although the elements of E0 are “small” in the above sense, some elements are “smaller”
than others. For instance, if ε is an infinitesimal, then ε2 is smaller than ε, meaning that
the ratio ε2/ε is itself infinitesimal: we say that ε2 is negligible with respect to ε. The
ability to rank infinitesimals into classes of “smallness” will be pivotal to our study. To
do so, we equip the set E0 with a total pre-order >∞ defined as follows: for any t1,
t2 ∈ E0, t1 >∞ t2 iff limη→0 t2/t1 ∈ [0,∞), which is equivalent to κ(t1) 6 κ(t2) (see
Lemma A.4(a)). Intuitively, t1 >∞ t2 says that t2 is at least as small as t1.
The >∞ pre-order can be naturally extended to elements of E and to R+, the set of
positive real numbers. For the particular case t1 = t2 = 0, we postulate 0>∞ 0.
The >∞ relation induces two other binary relations on E∪R+ as follows:
• t1 >∞ t2 iff t1 >∞ t2 and not t2 >∞ t1 (read “t2 is infinitesimally smaller than t1”) or
equivalently iff κ(t1) < κ(t2),
• t1 ≈∞ t2 iff both t1 >∞ t2 and t2 >∞ t1 (read “t2 is as small as t1”) or equivalently iff
κ(t1)= κ(t2).
When t1 ≈∞ t2, we also say that t1 and t2 are of the same order.
The inequality >∞ is irreflexive and transitive, and ≈∞ is reflexive, symmetric and
transitive, i.e., it is an equivalence relation (see Appendix B for proofs).
We also use the standard mathematical relations and operators on elements of E,
meaning pointwise application. For example, by t1 > t2 we mean t1(η) > t2(η) for every
η ∈ (0,1).
In this paper, we use the ordered set 〈E ∪ R+,>∞〉 to distinguish different orders of
infinitesimals. Note that 0 lays at the bottom of this structure, and all the elements of
E1 ∪ R+ at the top. More precisely, for any t ∈ E0 and a ∈ R+, we have a >∞ t and
t >∞ 0 — that is, elements of E0 are infinitesimally larger than 0 (in the sense of >∞),
but infinitesimally smaller than any real number. Moreover, if t ′ ∈ E1, we have t ′ >∞ t
and t ′ ≈∞ a, that is elements of E1 are infinitesimally larger than the elements of E0, and
they are of the same order as positive real numbers. (In fact, all real numbers are of the
same order: a ≈∞ b for all a, b ∈R+; intuitively, no positive real number is infinitesimally
larger than any other.) Appendix A reports more properties.
3. A belief function semantics for defaults
In this section, we adapt Adams’ ε-semantics to a belief function framework. First, we
introduce the notion of ε-belief functions, whose values are either (infinitesimally) close
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to 0 or close to 1. Next, we interpret a default rule αi→ βi as meaning that the conditional
belief bel(βi |αi) is close to 1. Finally, we define a consequence relation |∼ in a natural way:
α |∼β follows from a base of defaults ∆ if, for any ε-belief function bel that satisfies all
the default rules in ∆ (i.e., bel(βi |αi) is close to 1 for each rule αi→ βi ), bel(β|α) is close
to 1. As we will see, this definition produces the same results as Adams’ system.
3.1. Epsilon-belief functions
Our first step is to define ε-belief functions. Intuitively, these are functions whose
values are infinitesimal, and which are belief functions when the argument η of these
infinitesimals is fixed. Our aim is to study the limit behavior of these belief functions as η
tends to 0, in which case their values get close to 0 or 1. We shall do this using the>∞ and
≈∞ relations introduced above.
Definition 3. Let Ω be a finite non-empty set. An ε-mass assignment on Ω is a function
mE : 2Ω→ E such that, for all η ∈ (0,1),
(i) mE (∅)(η)= 0;
(ii) ∑X⊆Ω mE (X)(η)= 1.
The value of mE depends on η, but for any fixed η ∈ (0,1), mE is a (standard) basic
belief assignment on Ω . In fact, for all η, all the values mE (X)(η) are in [0,1] due to our
definition of infinitesimals (recall that, if t ∈ E, then for any η ∈ (0,1), t > 0 and t 6 1);
and they add up to 1 by definition. In practice, we will only consider the behavior of mE
when η tends to 0. As η approaches 0, all masses approach either 0 or 1. More precisely,
the masses of all focal elements are infinitesimal, except for one whose limit is 1.
If mE is an ε-mass assignment, for every η, we compute the belief function induced
by mE (|=)(η) via (2)—Section 2.3. The set of belief functions so obtained is denoted by
belE , and called an ε-belief function (εbf, for short). We denote by plE the corresponding
ε-plausibility function. Notice that the index E of mE is meant here to simply suggest the
special nature of the masses. Later in the paper, we shall study εbf’s which are built from
some specific set of infinitesimals E ⊆ E. The index E then will stand for this specific set.
The restrictions that we have imposed on infinitesimals as defined in Section 2.4
guarantee that an εbf exists. For example, mE (A)= 1− ε, mE (Ω)= ε, and mE (X) = 0
elsewhere, for some A⊆Ω and ε ∈ E0. We call an assignment of this form an ε-simple
support function.
Lemma 1. 5 Let mE be an ε-mass assignment. Then mE (A) ∈ E1 ∪ {1} for exactly one
element A⊆Ω , and mE (X) ∈ E0 ∪ {0} for all X ⊆Ω , X 6=A.
Moreover, under certain conditions, the result of applying Dempster’s rule of combina-
tion to εbf’s is itself an εbf, as stated by the following.
Lemma 2. Let m1 and m2 be two ε-mass assignments on Ω . Then m12 =m1 ⊕m2 is an
ε-mass assignment, provided that the normalization factor in the combination is 1.
5 The proofs of all lemmas and theorems are reported in Appendix B.
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The hypothesis on the normalization factor means that m1 and m2 have no disjoint focal
elements; as we shall see in Section 5, this is always true in our framework provided that
the default base ∆ is (classically) consistent.
Finally, we state a couple of properties that will be useful for working with εbf’s.




(b) plE (X)≈∞ maxx∈X plE ({x}).
3.2. εbf -entailment
We can use εbf’s to give semantics to default rules in a spirit similar to Adams’ use
of infinitesimal probabilities. From now on, and unless stated otherwise, the frame of
discernmentΩ will be assumed to be the set of all the distinct truth assignments (or worlds)
for our propositional languageL. Recall that we use [α] to denote the set {ω ∈Ω | ω |= α};
and that we use the abbreviations mE (α) for mE ([α]), and mE (ω) for mE ({ω}) (similarly
for belE and plE ).
Definition 4. Let belE be an εbf, and let α→ β be a default rule. We say that belE is an
εbf -model of α→ β , and write belE |= α→ β , iff plE (α ∧ β) >∞ plE (α ∧¬β).
We can give εbf-models other equivalent definitions, like those stated by the next lemma:
the first one has a more operational flavor; the second one uses conditional belief functions,
and thus it is closer to the spirit of Adams’ proposal.
Lemma 4. Let belE be an εbf, and let α→ β be a default rule.
(i) belE |= α→ β iff maxω|=α∧β plE (ω) >∞ maxω|=α∧¬β plE (ω).
(ii) belE |= α→ β iff limη→0 belE (β|α)= 1.
The notion of εbf-model can be extended to a full base ∆ of default rules in the obvious
way:
Definition 5. We say that belE is an εbf-model of ∆, written belE |= ∆, iff belE is an
εbf-model of each rule in ∆. We denote by EBF(∆) the set of all the εbf-models of ∆.
Thus, EBF(∆) is a subset of the set of all the ε-belief functions belE such that belE |=
α→ β for any default α→ β in ∆.
Our next step is to use εbf-models to define a notion of entailment for default bases, i.e.,
to define which conditional assertions α→ β are entailed by a default base ∆. A natural
way to do this is via the usual definition of logical entailment: ∆ entails α→ β , written
∆ |= α→ β , iff every εbf that is an εbf-model of ∆ is also an εbf-model of α→ β . That
is,
∆ |= α→ β iff for any belE in EBF(∆), belE |= α→ β. (3)
By construction, every rule in ∆ is entailed from ∆ itself, a property we will call the
“auto-deductivity property”.
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Recall that the default base ∆ is meant to represent our background knowledge. Once
∆ is fixed, (3) tells us which formulae are to be considered “normal consequences” of any
given formula α—namely, all the formulae β such that∆ |= α→ β holds. One goal in this
paper is to study the properties of the notion of “normal consequence” so obtained. We call
this consequence relation bf-consequence, and denote it by |∼bf. It follows from (3) that,
for a given ∆ and for any α,β ∈L,
α |∼bf β iff for any belE in EBF(∆),belE |= α→ β. (4)
As we show in the next subsection, the |∼bf relation is not entirely satisfactory, and we
shall define several more specific non-monotonic consequence relations in the rest of this
paper. In each case, the definition will look like (4), with the EBF(∆) set replaced by some
smaller set of εbf-models. These subsets will be obtained by imposing constraints on the
form of the εbf’s and/or on the ordering of the infinitesimals that they contain. In all cases,
we shall use formula (4) and Definitions 3, 4 and 5: together, these constitute the core of
our approach to defining non-monotonic systems using (epsilon-) belief functions.
3.3. A preferential view
Non-monotonic consequence relations are often characterized in terms of preferential
semantics [31,48]. In a nutshell, a preferential model is a structureW = (S,f,<) where S
is a finite set of states, f maps each state to a world, and < is a strict partial order over S.
The < order is meant to capture the idea that a state is “more normal” than another one; <
is sometimes called a preference relation. Given a preferential model W , a state s is called
a minimal, or preferred, state for a formula φ iff:
(i) f (s) |= φ, and
(ii) there is no state s′ in S such that s′ < s and f (s′) |= φ.
We may call s a <-preferred state for φ if we need to make the order< explicit. A formula
ψ is a consequence of φ in W , denoted by W |= φ → ψ, iff each preferred state s
for φ is such that f (s) |= ψ . Our belief function semantics can be given an equivalent
characterization in a preferential framework. More specifically, we can associate each
εbf belE with a preferential order among worlds in Ω as follows.
Definition 6. Let belE be an εbf onΩ , and let ω1 and ω2 be two worlds in Ω . We say that
ω1 is belE -preferred to ω2, and write ω1 ≺E ω2, iff plE (ω1) >∞ plE (ω2). We call the strict
partial order ≺E the belE -preference relation.
The order ≺E can be used to define the set of preferred worlds, according to belE , of a
given formula.
Definition 7. Let belE be an εbf on Ω , and α a formula of L. A world ω of Ω is a belE -
preferred world for α if:
(1) ω satisfies α; and
(2) there is no other world ω′ that satisfies α such that ω′ ≺E ω.
Recall that, by definition, the εbf-model relation |= is characterized by the >∞ relation
between values of plausibility. As the latter is closely related to ≺E , we may expect that
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the |= relation can be defined in a preferential way via ≺E . The following lemma shows
that this is indeed the case.
Lemma 5. Let belE be an εbf on Ω . For any α, β formulae of L, belE |= α→ β if, and
only if, each belE -preferred world of α satisfies β .
Characterizing bf-consequence in a preferential framework is useful for relating our
systems to other existing ones by making use of known results. For example, we can show
that a specific εbf-based system is equivalent to an existing preferential system by showing
that they share the same preference relation: we shall make extensive use of this technique
in Section 5. As a more immediate result, we show that bf-consequence is equivalent to the
system P of Kraus et al. [31]—which in turn is equivalent to Adams’ ε-system.
Theorem 1. For a given ∆, α |∼bf β if, and only if, α |∼P β .
Proof (Sketch, details in Appendix B). (⇒) Infinitesimal probability distributions are
a special case of εbf where only singletons are assigned a non-zero mass. Thus, bf-
consequence is a subset of Adams’ ε-consequence, which is equivalent to P -consequence.
(⇐) Lemma 4 tells us that the inference relation induced by any belE in EBF(∆) is
preferential, and therefore it satisfies all the rules of P . As this is true for any belE , then
|∼bf satisfies the rules of P , and so it contains all the preferential consequences of ∆. 2
This result tells us two things. First, we can use (epsilon) belief functions to give
semantics to system P , just as Adams used (epsilon) probabilities. Second, |∼bf suffers
from the same problems as system P , namely, the problems of irrelevance and of blocking
of inheritance; that is, bf-consequence is too weak with respect to our desiderata. In the rest
of this paper, we explore several ways to define bolder consequence relations by restricting
our attention in (4) (Section 3.2 above) to just some of the εbf-models in EBF(∆).
4. Using the least-commitment principle
We have seen that any ε-belief function induces a specific (preferential) order over the
possible worlds in Ω . In particular, any εbf-model of ∆ induces one such order which
is compatible with all the defaults in ∆ (in the sense specified by the |= relation). One
way to select some of the εbf-models of ∆ is by imposing some constraints on this order.
A reasonable constraint is to require it to be minimally informative: intuitively, we want to
look at the consequences of “only knowing”∆ (and nothing more).
4.1. ε-least commitment
The notion of a (classical) belief function being minimally informative is defined in [49].
The least-commitment principle states that, in order to model by a belief function bel an
item of information as “all what is known”, we should use the least committed belief
function that is compatible with that information. By recalling the definition of least
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commitment in Section 2, this means that, for any X ⊆ Ω , the value of bel(X) should
be as small as possible—said differently, the agent should not give any proposition more
belief than justified by what he/she knows. Recall that, when the item of information is
represented by a propositional formula α, the least committed belief function representing
it is the simple support function that gives a mass 1 to [α] and 0 anywhere else.
An item of information is usually compatible with a family of belief functions, denoted
B, and the application of the least-commitment principle consists ideally in finding the ele-
ment of B that is less committed than the other elements of B. Unfortunately usually such a
unique element does not exist. The application of the least-commitment principle produces
only the least committed set ΛB of the non-dominating elements of B (see Section 2.3).
Once εbf’s are used, the concept of least commitment must be extended into the concept
of ε-least commitment (εLC). 6 Since all we are interested in with εbf is their behavior
when η tends to 0, we focus on the εbf when η is in the neighborhood of 0 (to say that a
property holds when η is in the neighborhood of 0 means that there is a δ > 0 such that
the property holds for every 0< η < δ). One way to define εLC is based on a special form
of ‘generalization’, where all coefficients belong to {0,1} [29]. Consider two basic belief
assignmentsm1 andm2 where the masses ofm1 are obtained from the masses ofm2 in such
a way such that, for each A⊆Ω , the mass m2(A) is reallocated by m1 to some superset
of A. Let Π = {Π1, . . . ,Πn} be a partition of the subsets of Ω , and for each element Πi




m2(A) if AB 6= ∅,
and let all the other values ofm1 be null. So m2(A) is reallocated bym1 to a superset of A.
A consequence of this relation between m1 and m2 is that pl1(A)> pl2(A) for all A⊆Ω ,
which means that bel1 is less committed than bel2. m1 is called a {0,1}-generalization of
m2, and if m1 6=m2, then it is ‘strict’.
In the following definition of εLC, the first requirement encompasses the case when
infinitesimals are not involved, the second one is necessary when the εbf’s are involved
and their limits are equal when η tends to 0.
Definition 8 (ε-least commitment). Let bel1 and bel2 be two belief functions (classical or
εbf). We say that bel1 is εLC than bel2 if:
(1) limη→0 pl1(A)> limη→0 pl2(A) for all A⊆Ω, and at least one inequality is strict,
or
(2) limη→0 pl1(A)= limη→0 pl2(A) for all A⊆Ω , and m1 is a strict {0,1}-generaliza-
tion of m2 for every η in a neighborhood of 0.
To illustrate the meaning of the second requirement, consider two εbf’s beli with
mi(A) = 1 − εi , mi(Ω) = εi ∈ E0, i = 1,2, for some A ⊆ Ω . Their limits are equal
and both share the same focal elements A and Ω , so the first requirement does not
apply. The second requirement is not satisfied as none of the two belief functions is a
6 The shorthand εLC is used both for ‘ε-least commitment’, for ‘ε-least committed’ and for ‘ε-less committed’.
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{0,1}-generalization of the other. Thus none of bel1 and bel2 is εLC than the other, even
when ε2(η) > ε1(η) for all η.
The εLC principle can be used to build εbf’s that satisfy some constraints and that are
minimally committed. Let C be a set of constraints that must be satisfied by the εbf’s in
EBF(∆). We denote byΛC the set of the non-dominating elements of EBF(∆) that satisfy
the constraints in C where ‘non-dominating’ is derived from the use of the definition of
εLC. The next lemma illustrates the construction of a ΛC in which εbf’s have nested focal
elements and that will be used later on.
Lemma 6. Consider a set {A1, . . . ,An} of n nested subsets of Ω , with A1 ⊆ A2 ⊆ · · · ⊆
An, A1 6= ∅, An =Ω . Let C = {C1, . . . ,Cn} be a set of constraints Ci given by:
C1: pl(A1)= 1, and











4.2. A peeling algorithm based on ε-least commitment
We show how to build an εbf-model of∆ that satisfies the ε-least-commitment principle.
A similar approach has been proposed by Benferhat et al. [6] using possibility measures.
Intuitively, we proceed as follows. We start by the vacuous εbf, given by m0(Ω)= 1, and
m1(X) = 0 elsewhere. This is the least committed of all the εbf’s, but clearly it is not
an εbf-model of a non-empty ∆, as we do not have pl0(α ∧ β) >∞ pl0(α ∧ ¬β) for all
α→ β ∈ ∆. So, we build the focal element [φ∆] consisting of the worlds where all the
defaults in∆ are satisfied, and move “almost all” the mass currently on Ω to [φ∆], leaving
a small ε1 on Ω . That is, we build the εbf given by m1(φ∆) = 1− ε1,m1(Ω)= ε1, and
m1(X)= 0 elsewhere, where ε1 is an infinitesimal. When there are no conflicting defaults
in∆, this εbf is an εbf-model of∆ (take any α→ β ∈∆, and note that [α∧β]∩ [φ∆] 6= ∅
because otherwise α → β would be conflicting, and that [α ∧ ¬β] ∩ [φ∆] = ∅, so
pl1(α ∧ β)= 1− ε1 and pl1(α ∧¬β)= ε1, with 1− ε1 >∞ ε1). If there are still conflicts,
however, this εbf may not satisfy some of the defaults in ∆, so it is not an εbf-model of
∆ (see Example 1 below for an illustration). In this case, we consider the set ∆′ of all
the defaults that are not satisfied, and build a second focal element [φ∆′ ]. By construction,
[φ∆] ⊆ [φ∆′ ]. We then move “almost all” the ε1 mass currently on Ω to [φ∆′ ], leaving a
“small” ε2 on Ω ; that is, we build the εbf given by m1(φ∆)= 1− ε1, m1(φ∆′)= ε1 − ε2,
m1(Ω)= ε2, and m1(X) = 0 otherwise, with ε2 an infinitesimal such that ε1 >∞ ε2. By
reasoning as above, it is easy to see that when there are no conflicts in ∆′ this new εbf is
an εbf-model of ∆′ (and of ∆). If there are still conflicts in ∆′, we iterate the procedure
until the εbf so built satisfies all the defaults in ∆.
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Fig. 1. The LC algorithm.
More precisely, let n be the cardinality of ∆, and let E = {ε1, . . . , εn} be a set of
infinitesimals such that
εi >∞ εi+1 and εi > εi+1 for all i = 1, . . . , n− 1. (5)
(Recall that εi > εi+1 means εi(η) > εi+1(η) for all η ∈ (0,1).) Note that such a set always
exists: for instance, we can take εi = δi for some arbitrary infinitesimal δ. From this set,
we build an εbf using the LC algorithm shown in Fig. 1. We start from a vacuous belief
assignment (Step 0). At each step i , we add a new focal element [φΓi ] corresponding to
the words that satisfy the defaults in ∆ not already satisfied by the current εbf, and give
it a mass εi−1 − εi , taken off from the mass currently given to Ω (with the convention
that ε0 = 1). We repeat this process until the obtained εbf satisfies all the defaults in ∆.
Failing to find an εbf occurs if ∆ (more precisely, φ∆) is inconsistent (Step 1(e)). It is
easy to see that the εbf returned in Step 2 is indeed an εbf according to Definition 4; in
particular, the requirement that εi > εi+1 for all i guarantees that, for any η ∈ (0,1), all
masses are in [0,1]. Notice that the focal elements are nested, the inner one being [φ∆],
and therefore the εbf so built is consonant. By Lemma 6 then, this εbf belongs to ΛC ,
the set of εLC belief functions that satisfy the set C of constraints imposed by the auto-
deductivity requirement:
pl(α ∧ β) >∞ pl(α ∧¬β) for each α→ β ∈∆.
Example 1. Let ∆ = {b→f,p→ b,p→ ¬f } where “b” stands for “bird”, “f ” for
“flies”, and “p” for “penguin”, and let E = {ε1, ε2, ε2} such that (5) is satisfied. We have
Γ1 =∆, and bel1 given bym1(φΓ1)= 1−ε1,m1(Ω)= ε1, andm1(X)= 0 otherwise, with
[φΓ1] =
[
(¬b ∨ f )∧ (¬p ∨ b)∧ (¬p ∨¬f )]
= [b ∧¬p ∧ f ] ∪ [¬b ∧¬p ∧ f ] ∪ [¬b ∧¬p ∧¬f ].
Hence:
pl1(b ∧ f )= 1− ε1 + ε1 = 1, pl1(b ∧¬f )= ε1,
pl1(p ∧ b)= ε1, pl1(p ∧¬b)= ε1,
pl1(p ∧¬f )= ε1, pl1(p ∧ f )= ε1.
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From this, we compute the set sat1 of defaults which are satisfied by bel1: sat1 = {b→
f } (using Lemma 3, and recalling that 1>∞ ε1 by Lemma A.7(b)). We iterate, and get Γ2
by removing b→ f from Γ1. Now,
[φΓ2] = [b ∧¬p ∧ f ] ∪ [¬b ∧¬p ∧ f ] ∪ [b ∧¬p ∧¬f ] ∪
[¬b ∧¬p ∧¬f ] ∪ [b ∧ p ∧¬f ],
and bel2 is given by
m2(Ω)= ε2; m2(φΓ2)= ε1 − ε2;
m2(φΓ1)= 1− ε1; m2(X)= 0 otherwise.
Then,
pl2(p ∧ b)= ε1, pl2(p ∧¬b)= ε2,
pl2(p ∧¬f )= ε1, pl2(p ∧ f )= ε2.
All the defaults in Γ2 are now satisfied (as ε1 >∞ ε2 by (5)) and the algorithm ends
returning bel2. This is a consonant ε-belief function with focal elements [φΓ1] ⊆ [φΓ2].
We denote by Bellc(∆) the family of all the εbf’s that can be built by the above
procedure; the elements of this family differ in the choice of the E set of infinitesimals,
provided that (5) is satisfied. The following lemma shows that this family “behaves well”
for our goals: it is a subset of EBF(∆), and each element in the family induces the same
ordering ≺ on the worlds in Ω . The latter property means that we can decide entailment
by looking at just one element of Bellc(∆).
Lemma 7. Let ∆ be a default base. Then:
(a) Any element of Bellc(∆) is an εbf-model of ∆.
(b) Let bel1 and bel2 be two elements of Bellc(∆), and ≺1 and ≺2 the corresponding
orderings induced on Ω . Then, ≺1≡≺2.
4.3. The LC consequence relation
We can use the set Bellc(∆) to define a new non-monotonic consequence relation: we
call this relation LC consequence, and denote it by |∼lc. The definition of |∼lc is similar to
(4) in Section 3.2, except that we now restrict the attention to the εbf-models that are in
Bellc(∆):
α |∼lc β iff for any belE in Bellc(∆), belE |= α→ β. (6)
Note that, as Bellc(∆) is a subset of EBF(∆), LC consequence is stronger than bf-con-
sequence; that is, if α |∼bf β , then also α |∼lc β . Theorem 1 then tells us that LC con-
sequence is also stronger than system P . The following example shows that it is strictly
stronger than P ; in fact, we shall show in the next subsection that LC consequence
precisely coincides with Pearl’s system Z.
Example 1 (continued). We can use the bel2 εbf built above to verify that we have
b∧p |∼lc¬f . In fact, we have pl2(b∧ p ∧¬f )= ε1, pl2(b∧ p ∧ f )= ε2, and ε1 >∞ ε2
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by (5). Hence, by Lemma 2, b ∧ p |∼lc¬f . Moreover, if r is a new propositional variable
(e.g., “red”), we have b ∧ r |∼lc f : in fact, pl2(b ∧ r ∧ ¬f )= ε1, pl2(b ∧ r ∧ f )= 1, and
1 >∞ ε1. That is, and differently from system P , irrelevant properties like “red” do not
block the inheritance of the “fly” property.
4.4. A note on stratification
In building the focal elements, the LC algorithm builds a collection of nested sets
Γ = {Γ1,Γ2, . . . ,Γk}: we start with Γ1 =∆, and then build each Γi by eliminating some
defaults from Γi−1. The collection Γ induces a partition {∆1,∆2, . . . ,∆k} of ∆ in the
obvious way: we let ∆i = Γi − Γi+1, i = 1, . . . , k − 1, and ∆k = Γk′ . For instance, in
Example 1 above, we have∆1 = {b→ f } and∆2 = {p→ b,p→¬f }. It is easy to realize
that∆i contains exactly the defaults that are satisfied by the beli εbf, but were not satisfied
by beli−1. An ordered partition of ∆ as the one above is often called a stratification, or
ranking, of ∆.
The idea to stratify the default base ∆ was first suggested by Pearl [40]. To overcome
the problem of irrelevance in Adams’ ε-consequence relation, Pearl proposed a default
reasoning system, called Z, based on a ranking of default rules that respects the notion
of specificity. Pearl defines three relations between a default rule α→ β and a possible
world ω: the world verifies the rule if ω |= α ∧ β ; it satisfies it if ω |= ¬α ∨ β ; and
it falsifies it if ω |= α ∧¬β . Given a default base ∆ = {αi → βi | i = 1, . . . ,m}, Pearl
gives a method to rank-order the rules in ∆ such that the least specific rules (i.e., with
most general antecedents) get the least priority. To do this, he defines the notion of
tolerance: a rule α→ β is said to be tolerated by a base ∆ = {αi → βi, i = 1, . . . ,m}
iff {α ∧ β,¬α1 ∨ β1, . . . ,¬αm ∨ βm} is consistent. Then, he partitions ∆ into an ordered
set (stratification) {∆1,∆2, . . . ,∆k} such that rules in ∆i are tolerated by all rules in
∆i ∪ · · · ∪ ∆k . Correspondingly, he defines a ranking Z over the rules of ∆ by letting
Z(d)= i for each rule d in ∆i .
From this ranking, Pearl defines a non-monotonic consequence relation |∼Z in the
following way. First, he builds a ranking function κ on the worlds from the Z ranking
by
κ(ω)=max{Z(di)+ 1 | ω |= αi ∧¬βi, di = αi→ βi ∈∆},
and κ(ω)= 1 if ω satisfies all the rules of ∆.
Intuitively, κ(ω) is lower for worlds that only violate rules that are in lower subbases—
i.e., that are less specific. Second, he induces from κ a ranking function z on formulas
by
z(α)=min{κ(ω) | ω |= α}.
z(α) is low if all the models of α have low rank. So, z(α) can be read as a degree of
“abnormality” of α with respect to the rules in ∆. Note that z is a disbelief function in the
sense of Spohn [59]. Indeed, we have z(α∨β)=min(z(α), z(β)). Finally, the |∼Z relation
is defined by
α |∼Z β iff z(α ∧ β) < z(α ∧¬β).
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An equivalent treatment of default information has been done in the framework of
possibility theory [6].
The above stratification coincides with the one produced by the LC algorithm. 7 To see
why, consider a default base ∆, and let {∆1,∆2, . . . ,∆k} be the stratification of ∆ built
by Pearl’s algorithm, and {∆′1, ∆′2, . . . ,∆′k} be the one built by LC. As we noticed above,
each ∆′i subbase contains exactly the default rules that are satisfied by beli , the εbf built
by the LC algorithm at step i; that is, for each α→ β of ∆,α → β ∈ ∆′i if and only
if beli |= α→ β . The following lemma shows that the ∆i subbase generated by Pearl’s
system contains exactly the same defaults.
Lemma 8. Let {∆1,∆2, . . . ,∆k} be the stratification given by system Z, and let beli be
the εbf built by the LC algorithm at step i . Then, for any default α→ β in ∆,
(a) α→ β is tolerated by ∆ iff pl1(α)= 1.
(b) α→ β is not tolerated by ∆i ∪ · · · ∪∆k iff pli (α ∧ β)= pli (α ∧¬β)= εi .
(c) α→ β ∈∆i implies beli |= α→ β .
(d) beli |= α→ β and pli−1(α ∧ β) = pli−1(α ∧ ¬β) = εi−1 (i.e., beli−1 6|= α→ β)
implies that α→ β ∈∆.
The fact that the ranking produced by the LC algorithm coincides with the one of
system Z tells us that the LC consequence precisely coincides with Pearl’s system, and
those systems equivalent to system Z like the one based on possibilistic logic [6,12].
Theorem 2. For a given ∆, α |∼lc β if, and only if, α |∼Z β .
Proof. Immediate consequence of Lemma 8. 2
The stratification produced by Pearl’s algorithm or by our LC algorithm induces an
ordering that respects the specificity requirement. This is a useful property, and we will
use this ordering for defining several non-monotonic systems in the next section. It should
be emphasized that, although LC and Z produce the same stratification of∆, our approach
differs from Pearl’s in the choice of the primitive notion. In system Z, one starts from an
a priori definition of “tolerance”, while in the LC approach we start from the notion of
being “less committed”. Which of the two notions provides a more natural starting point is
a matter of opinion.
5. Using Dempster’s rule of combination
The second route that we propose to explore to obtain a stronger consequence relation
is to strengthen (4) (in Section 3.2) by considering only the εbf-models of ∆ that can be
built by using Dempster’s rule of combination. The intuitive argument goes as follows.
7 Upon reflection, this result is not so surprising. The εbf produced by the LC algorithm is a consonant belief
function, hence it corresponds to a possibility measure; and, as shown by [6], possibility measures can be used in
a natural way to generate a Z-equivalent ranking of a default base.
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(A similar construction has been suggested by Wilson, see Section 8.) Suppose that we
regard each default in ∆ as being one item of evidence provided by one of several dis-
tinct sources of information, each associated with a weight that indicates its reliability,
i.e., the relative “stiffness” of the default rule it provides. Then, it makes sense to repre-
sent each default by one (epsilon-) belief function, and to combine these belief functions
by Dempster’s rule to obtain a representation of the aggregate effect of all the defaults
in ∆. 8 We can then define entailment by looking at the conditionals that are satisfied by
the combined belief function. The characteristics of the consequence relation so obtained
depend on certain conditions over the relative weights of the defaults. As we show below,
we can re-obtain several of the non-monotonic relations that have been proposed in the
literature by imposing the right conditions. In Section 6, we will use more general condi-
tions and obtain a new consequence relation that has several advantages over the current
proposals.
5.1. Entailment based on Dempster’s rule
In order to build the combined εbf mentioned above, we first have to decide which belief
function to use to represent each individual default rule. Sticking to the arguments used in
the last section, we propose to use the ε-least committed εbf that satisfies that default. More
precisely, for each default rule d = α→ β, we want the corresponding ε-mass assignment
md to be minimally committed in the sense explained in Section 4 (see Definition 8): that
is, md should belong to the set Λd of non-dominant εbf’s that satisfy the default d . From
Lemma 6, this means that each md must have the form
md(Ω)= εd; md(φd)= 1− εd; and md(X)= 0 otherwise,
where εd is an infinitesimal in E0. Given a default base ∆ = {d1, . . . , dn}, we consider a
set E = {ε1, . . . , εn} of infinitesimals, and associate each default di to εi ; we write εd to
denote the infinitesimal associated to the default d ∈ ∆. Intuitively, εd accounts for the
“violability” of rule d . From these ∆ and E we build a combined ε-mass assignment m⊕
by Dempster’s rule as follows:
m⊕ =
⊕
{md | d ∈∆}, (7)
where each md is as above. We denote by bel⊕ and pl⊕ the corresponding ε-belief and
ε-plausibility functions. Note that, no matter what E , each md is an ε-mass assignment. As
far as ∆ is consistent,
⋂
d∈∆[φd ] = [φ∆] 6= ∅, so the Lemma 2 condition is satisfied and
m⊕ is thus an ε-mass assignment.
The εbf’s built by (7) have in general a much more complex structure than the ones used
in LC: the focal elements are not nested, and values may include products of several εd
and (1 − εd) for different d . Luckily, as we only care for the order of magnitude of the
8 The construction given below should extend to the case where each source Si of information provides a base
∆i of defaults instead of just one default. We could use the ε-least-commitment principle to build a representative
εbf for each ∆i as discussed in the previous section, and then combine these representatives by Dempster’s rule.
The exploration of this issue is left for future work.
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infinitesimals, the plausibility value of each world can be computed in a simple way as
follows.
Lemma 9. Let bel⊕ be an εbf built from ∆ and E as above. Then, for any world ω in Ω ,
pl⊕(ω)≈∞
∏
{εd | d ∈∆ s.t. ω 6|= φd },
and pl⊕(ω)≈∞ 1 if ω satisfies all the defaults in ∆.
In what follows, we shall use tω to denote the product of εd ’s that gives the plausibility






with the stipulation that tω = 1 if ω satisfies all the defaults in ∆. We call tω the term
associated to ω; note that, for any ω, tω ∈ E. Lemma 9 together with Lemma 3 allow us to
compute the (order of the) plausibility value of any formula α by:
pl⊕(α)≈∞ max
ω|=α tω. (9)
Given a default base ∆, we denote by Bel⊕(∆) the family of all εbf’s that can be built
from ∆ using Dempster’s rule according to (7); the elements of Bel⊕(∆) differ in the
choice of the set E of infinitesimals associated to the defaults in ∆. We can use Bel⊕(∆)
to define a new notion of non-monotonic consequence, denoted by |∼⊕, as follows
α |∼⊕ β iff for any belE in Bel⊕(∆),belE |= α→ β, (10)
where ∆ represents, as usual, the given background knowledge.
Example 2. Let again ∆ = {b→ f, p→¬f, p→ b}, and let E = {ε1, ε2, ε3} be the
infinitesimals associated to the defaults in ∆. The ε-mass assignments md corresponding
to these defaults are given by
m1(¬b ∨ f )= 1− ε1, m1(Ω)= ε1,
m2(¬p ∨¬f )= 1− ε2, m2(Ω)= ε2,
m3(¬p ∨ b)= 1− ε3, m3(Ω)= ε3.
According to (7) we have, for all X, m⊕(X)= (m1 ⊕m2 ⊕m3)(X). The value of pl⊕ for
any proposition of interest can be computed by (9). For instance, we have:
pl⊕(b ∧ p ∧ f )≈∞ ε2, pl⊕(b ∧ p ∧¬f )≈∞ ε1,
pl⊕(b ∧¬p ∧ f )≈∞ 1, pl⊕(¬b ∧ p ∧ f )≈∞ ε1 · ε2.
From this, we see that
bel⊕ |= b ∧ p→¬f iff ε1 >∞ ε2;
thus, we have b ∧ p |∼⊕¬f if and only if the ε1 >∞ ε2 relation is guaranteed to hold for
all the elements of Bel⊕(∆).
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The last example shows that the |∼⊕ consequence relation built in this way is not
interesting if we let all the εd to be equal—for example, we could not deduce that birds who
are penguins do not fly. More generally, it shows that the properties of |∼⊕ are determined
by the >∞ relations that exist between the elements εd of E , and the induced >∞ and
≈∞ relations—that is, on the relative stiffness of the defaults in ∆. In fact, the properties
of |∼⊕ depend in general on the ordering between values of pl⊕, that is, by (9), between
terms.
In the rest of this paper, we explore the properties of different consequence relations
obtained from (10) by imposing different types of constraints on the E parameters; these
constraints are typically in the form of a set of >∞-inequalities between terms. In the
following subsections, we impose some a priori constraints inspired by four existing
systems, and we obtain consequence relations, which are equivalent to these systems. In
the next section, we will use constraints coming from general principles, and obtain a new
consequence relation that is incomparable with all the existing systems we are aware of
and that go beyond system P . The ability of εbf’s to capture several existing approaches
in a uniform framework is an important property; however, the reader mainly interested in
the new system can directly jump to Section 6.
5.2. Penalty-based order
We now start our analysis of special cases of the |∼⊕ consequence relations. In each case,
we define a class of sets E of infinitesimals using a construction inspired by an existing
system, and consider the consequence relation obtained by (10) when we restrict attention
to the εbf’s belE in Bel⊕(∆) which are built from these sets. In each case, we shall show
that any such belE induces the same belE -preference relation ≺E on Ω (see Definition 7),
and that this preference relation is the same as the one of the inspiring system. Hence, the
εbf-consequence relation so defined is equivalent to the one of the target system. The first
case that we consider is inspired by the so-called “penalty logic” proposed by Pinkas [42],
and applied by Dupin et al. [16] to handle inconsistencies in knowledge bases. It should be
noted that penalty logic, as well as the other systems considered below, has originally been
proposed as an inconsistency-handling technique. However, all of these approaches also
apply to default reasoning, since the latter can be seen as a particular case of inconsistency
handling—the observation of an exceptional situation leads to an inconsistent knowledge
base, which needs to be revised. Technically, each one of the approaches considered here
leads to a preferential order over the interpretations, which in turn induces a non-monotonic
consequence relation over the formulas. In each case, we show that the same order can be
recovered using εbf’s. Symmetrically, our reformulation show that εbf’s can be used to
deal with the general case of knowledge base revision in the face of inconsistency.
In penalty logic, each formula of a knowledge baseΣ is associated with a number, called
penalty, which represents a kind of price to pay if this formula is not satisfied. The sum of
the penalties of all the formulae that are not satisfied by an interpretation ω is called the
cost of ω; this cost induces a preference over interpretations (see the proof of Lemma 10
in Appendix B for details).
We can easily reproduce the behavior of penalty logic in our framework. Let ∆ be
a default base, and let {∆1, . . . ,∆k} be a stratification of ∆ that respects specificity;
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for example, the stratification generated by the LC algorithm, or equivalently by Pearl’s
system Z. We build the set E = {ε1, . . . , εn} of infinitesimals associated to∆ as follows: we
take an arbitrary infinitesimal δ and let, for each d ∈∆i, εd = δi . Intuitively, we need the
exponential to recover the additive behavior of penalties from the multiplicative behavior
of our εd ’s (see Lemma 9). Note that any such εd obviously satisfies the definition of
infinitesimals in Section 2.4. We denote by Bel⊕1(∆) the family of εbf’s obtained from
these εd ’s by applying (7); these εbf’s differ in the choice of the δ infinitesimal. Each εbf
in this family induces the same ordering on Ω as the one used in penalty logic.
Lemma 10. Let ω and ω′ be elements of Ω , and let belE be any element of Bel⊕1(∆).
Then, ω is penalty-preferred to ω′ if and only if ω is belE -preferred to ω′.
Finally, we let |∼⊕1 be the non-monotonic consequence relation obtained by using
Bel⊕1(∆) for Bel⊕(∆) in (10) in Section 5.1.
Theorem 3. Let |∼pen be the inference relation of penalty logic. Then, for any given ∆,
α |∼pen β if, and only if, α |∼⊕1 β.
Proof. By Lemma 5, |∼⊕1 can be defined in a preferential way. So, both |∼⊕1 and |∼pen are
preferential relations, and the theorem follows by noting that they are based on the same
order. 2
5.3. The lexicographic system
The second case that we consider is the lexicographic system defined by Benferhat et al.
[4], and Lehmann [34], and set by Dubois et al. [13] in the framework of possibilistic logic.
A similar approach has also been considered in diagnosis by de Kleer [30] and Lang [32].
The main idea is to again start from a stratification {∆1, . . . ,∆k} of ∆, and regard all
defaults in the ith layer as being equally important, and being more important than any set
of defaults in subsequent layers (see the proof of Lemma 11 in Appendix B for a complete
description of the lexicographic system).
We can reproduce the behavior of the lexicographic system by our approach by imposing
a corresponding order on the εd ’s. We again start from the LC (or Z) stratification





j >∞ δi, for i = 2, . . . , n+ 1,
where |∆j | is the number of defaults in ∆j . 9 We than build E by letting εd = δi for each
i and each d ∈ ∆i . Clearly, any such εd is an infinitesimal. We denote by Bel⊕2(∆) the
9 A similar condition has been proposed by Snow [57] to define a class of probability distributions called
“Atomic bound systems”. A probability distribution is an Atomic bound system iff there exists a linear ordering
>s on Ω , such that for each ω ∈Ω, P(ω) >∑ω>sω′ P(ω′). With a logarithmic transformation, this condition is
very close to the one given above between infinitesimals.
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family of εbf’s obtained from these εd ’s by applying (7) (in Section 5.1). These εbf’s differ
in the choice of the δi infinitesimals, provided that they satisfy the above constraints. Each
εbf in Bel⊕2(∆) induces the same ordering on Ω as the one used in the lexicographic
approaches.
Lemma 11. Let ω and ω′ be elements of Ω , and let belE be any element of Bel⊕2(∆).
Then, ω is lex-preferred to ω′ if and only if ω is belE -preferred to ω′.
Finally, we let |∼⊕2 be the consequence relation obtained by using Bel⊕2(∆) in (10) (in
Section 5.1).
Theorem 4. Let |∼lex be the inference relation of the lexicographic system. Then, for any
given ∆, α |∼lex β if, and only if, α |∼⊕2 β .
Proof. Immediate, as |∼⊕2 and |∼lex are preferential relations based on the same order. 2
5.4. Brewka’s preferred subtheories
The third approach that we consider are the preferred subtheories originally proposed by
Brewka [10], and later independently introduced in [13] in the setting of possibilistic logic.
This approach has also been used by Boutilier [9] in system Z to define a non-monotonic
inference relation, and by Baral et al. [3] to combine belief bases. The core of the approach
is the same as for the lexicographic one, the main difference being the definition of the
ordering on Ω (see the proof of Lemma 12 in Appendix B for details).
To recover Brewka’s ordering in our framework, we let {∆1, . . . ,∆k} be the LC (or Z)
stratification of a given base ∆. Let then dij be the j th default (according to an arbitrary
enumeration) in the ith layer ∆i . We build E by associating to each dij an infinitesimal εij





εjh >∞ εis for all s = 1, . . . , |∆i |,
where |∆i | is number of defaults in ∆i . The main difference between these constraints and
those used to recover the lexicographical system is that here εij and εih are not constrained
for all j 6= h, while in the lexicographical systems they are considered as equivalent.
We denote by Bel⊕3(∆) the family of εbf’s obtained by (7) in Section 5.1 for different
choices of the εij infinitesimals, provided that they satisfy the above constraints. Clearly
Bel⊕2(∆)⊆ Bel⊕3(∆).
The following lemma shows the ordering based on Bel⊕3(∆) induces the same ordering
on Ω as the one used by Brewka.
Lemma 12. Let ω and ω′ be elements of Ω . Then, ω is B-preferred to ω′ if and only if ω
is belE -preferred to ω′ in each belE of Bel⊕3(∆).
Finally, we let |∼⊕3 be the consequence relation obtained by using Bel⊕3(∆) in (10) (in
Section 5.1).
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Theorem 5. Let |∼B be the inference relation of Brewka’s preferred subtheories system.
Then, for any given ∆, α |∼B β if, and only if, α |∼⊕3 β .
Proof. See Appendix B. 2
5.5. Geffner’s conditional entailment
The fourth approach that we consider here is Geffner’s conditional entailment [21].
Geffner’s approach differs from the previous ones in the following points:
• Several orders between defaults are considered rather than just one. Each of them is
called admissible with the default base ∆.
• The order between default rules is in general a partial order (in the previous
approaches, it was a complete pre-ordering).
An order between elements of a default base ∆, denoted by >∆, is said to be admissible
with ∆ if, whenever a subbase D ⊆∆ does not tolerate a default d ∈∆, then D contains
another default d ′ such that d >∆ d ′. (Tolerate here is taken in the sense of Pearl’s
system Z.) Each admissible order >∆ on∆ induces an order overΩ in the following way:
ω >Ω ω
′ iff, for each default d falsified by ω but satisfied by ω′, there exists a default d ′
satisfied by ω but falsified by ω′ such that d ′ >∆ d . 10 The quadruple (Ω,>Ω,∆,>∆) is
called a prioritized admissible structure. Finally, Geffner defines a conditional entailment
relation |∼G in the usual way by α |∼G β iff, for each admissible prioritized structure
(Ω,>Ω,∆,>∆), β holds in all the >Ω -preferential models of α.
We can capture Geffner’s conditional entailment in our framework. For each admissible
preference relation >∆ on ∆, we build the set E by associating to each d ∈ ∆ an
infinitesimal εd ∈ E such that:
(1) for all d, d ′ ∈∆, if d >∆ d ′ then εd ′ >∞ εd ; and
(2) for all d ∈∆, ∏d ′ : εd ′>∞εd εd ′ >∞ εd .
The second default requires that, if the infinitesimal corresponding to a default is
(infinitesimally) smaller than the infinitesimals corresponding to other defaults, it also be
(infinitesimally) smaller than their product.
Let >∆ be an admissible preference relation on ∆. We denote by Bel⊕(∆,>∆)
the family of εbf’s in Bel⊕(∆), associated to >∆, whose parameter E satisfies the
above constraints. Each εbf in Bel⊕(∆,>∆) encodes the admissible prioritized structure
associated to >∆:
Lemma 13. Let >∆ be an admissible preference relation on ∆, and (Ω,>Ω,∆,>∆) be
an admissible prioritized structure. Then, for any ω and ω′ in Ω , ω >Ω ω′ if and only if ω




Bel⊕(∆,>∆) s.t. >∆ is admissible with ∆
}
10 Note that the total ordering on ∆ induced by the stratification given by the LC algorithm (or system Z) is
admissible with ∆. Moreover, when >∆ is again the stratification given by the LC algorithm, then the definition
of >Ω given by Geffner is exactly the same as the one induced by Brewka’s preferred subtheories.
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the family of εbf’s in Bel⊕(∆) obtained by taking into account all the orders >∆ which
are admissible with ∆. Finally, we let |∼⊕4 be the consequence relation obtained by using
Bel⊕4(∆) in (10) (in Section 5.1).
Theorem 6. For a given ∆, α |∼G β if, and only if, α |∼⊕4 β .
Proof. Immediate consequence of Lemma 13. 2
Note that the complexity results of several non-monotonic inference relations discussed
in this section can be for instance found in [17].
6. Using both the LC principle and Dempster’s rule
We have seen how to define several non-monotonic consequence relations based on the
Bel⊕(∆) family of εbf’s by imposing some a priori constraints over (products of) the
weights εd associated to the different defaults in ∆. Until now, we have considered ad hoc
constraints inspired by existing non-monotonic systems. In this section, we take a different
route, and generate the constraints starting from two general principles: the combined εbf’s
should satisfy all the defaults in ∆; and it should be least committed, in a sense that we
shall soon define. As we will show, the resulting consequence relation, that we name LCD,
is distinct from all the current non-monotonic systems that we are aware of; moreover,
LCD adequately addresses all the desiderata listed in the Introduction.
Recall that the Bel⊕(∆) family in the previous section was built from a given set ∆=
{d1, . . . , dn} of defaults and an arbitrary set E = {ε1, . . . , εn} of infinitesimals associated
to these defaults. Also recall that the properties of the induced consequence relation |∼⊕
critically depend on certain properties of E , namely, on the >∞ ordering between its
elements and terms. We now propose to restrict the Bel⊕(∆) family by restricting the
choice of the E set in such a way that the two following principles are satisfied:
• Auto-deduction principle. For any belE in Bel⊕(∆), we want that belE |= α→ β for
each rule α→ β in ∆; said differently, we want Bel⊕(∆)⊆ EBF(∆).
• Least-commitment principle. We want each belE to be minimally committed among
the belE resulting from the auto-deduction principle, that is, we want it to convey as
little information as possible while still satisfying all the defaults in ∆.
The auto-deduction principle amounts to requiring that our belE be εbf-models of∆; this
principle was already satisfied by the non-monotonic consequence relations considered in
the previous section. The least-commitment principle deserves more comments. Given the
way in which Bel⊕(∆) is built, this principle includes two distinct facets. The first one
concerns the form of the individual md ’s used in the combination, and has already been
discussed in Section 5.1: it translates to the requirement that each md is a simple support
function with focus φd ,
md(Ω)= εd; md(φd)= 1− εd; and md(X)= 0 otherwise;
with εd ∈ E .
The second facet is new, and it concerns the choice of the E set: we want this set to be
“as free as possible” with respect to the >∞ ordering between its elements and terms; as
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we shall see shortly, this corresponds to requiring that the elements of E be “as large as
possible” while retaining the auto-deduction property.
In the rest of this section, we show how we can translate the above principles into a
precise set of >∞ constraints on E . These constraints identify a specific subfamily of
Bel⊕(∆) which we will use to define our new consequence relation.
6.1. The auto-deduction principle
By Definition 4 and Lemma 4, the auto-deduction principle means that, for each default
d = α→ β in ∆, we must have
max
ω|=α∧β pl⊕(ω) >∞ maxω|=α∧¬β pl⊕(ω).
This constraint is equivalent to
Cd : max
ω|=α∧β tω >∞ maxω|=α∧¬β tω,
where the tω’s are the terms defined by (8) in Section 5.1 above, and we have used
Lemma A.9(b) to substitute equivalent infinitesimals inside inequalities. Note that we can
equivalently write:
Cd : for all ω s.t. ω |= α ∧¬β, there is a ω′ s.t. ω′ |= α ∧ β and tω′ >∞ tω.
Given ∆, the auto-deduction principle translates to a set of constraints C∆ = {Cd | d ∈∆}
between the terms of E ; any belE built from a set E that satisfies these constraints also
satisfies the auto-deduction principle; said differently, this belE is an εbf-model of ∆.
Example 3. Let∆= {p→ fa∨b, fa→ b, b→ fa, p→¬f, b→ f }, where p, fa, b, f
stand for “penguin”, “feathered animal”, “bird” and “fly”, and let E = {ε1, ε2, ε3, ε4, ε5} be
the corresponding set of infinitesimals. Table 1 gives all what is needed to compute the C∆
constraints.
Each row in the table represents a possible truth assignment to our four propositional
variables or world. A
√
mark in the di column indicates that the world does not satisfy the
default di , that is, φdi is false in that world. For each world ω, the term tω is given by the
product of the εd ’s for the defaults d marked by a
√
in the ω row. E.g., t3 = ε3ε5. The Ci
column is used to write the auto-deduction constraint for the default di = αi→ βi : we put
an L mark for each world that satisfies αi ∧ βi , and an R mark for each world that satisfies
αi ∧ ¬βi . We then write the Ci constraint as follows: for the left-hand side, we take the
maximum of the terms tω over the worlds ω marked by L in the Ci column, where tω is
obtained as above; we proceed in a similar way for the right-hand side using the R worlds.
In our example, we obtain the following five constraints:
C1: max{ε3ε5, ε3ε4, ε2, ε2ε4, ε5, ε4}>∞ max{ε1, ε1ε4},
C2: max{ε5,1, ε4}>∞ max{ε2, ε2ε4},
C3: max{ε5,1, ε4}>∞ max{ε3ε5, ε3, ε3ε4},
C4: max{ε1, ε3ε5, ε2, ε5}>∞ max{ε1ε4, ε3ε4, ε2ε4, ε4},
C5: max{ε3,1, ε3ε4, ε4}>∞ max{ε3ε5, ε5}.
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Table 1
Construction of the C∆ constraints of Example 3
ω p fa b f d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5
1 F F F F
2 F F F T
3 F F T F √ √ R R
4 F F T T √ R L
5 F T F F √ R
6 F T F T √ R
7 F T T F √ L L R
8 F T T T L L L
9 T F F F √ R L
10 T F F T √ √ R R
11 T F T F √ √ L R L R
12 T F T T √ √ L R R L
13 T T F F √ L R L
14 T T F T √ √ L R R
15 T T T F √ L L L L R
16 T T T T √ L L L R L
The properties of infinitesimals given in Appendix A allow us to simplify these constraints.
For example, from Lemma A.8(c), we can deduce: ε2 >∞ ε2ε4; ε4 >∞ ε3ε4; and ε5 >∞
ε3ε5. Hence, by Lemma A.12, max{ε2, ε5, ε4} ≈∞ max{ε3ε5, ε3ε4, ε2, ε2ε4, ε5, ε4}, and
we can replace the former for the latter in C1 by virtue of Lemma A.9(b). By similar
arguments, we obtain the following simplified set of constraints:
C1: max{ε2, ε5, ε4}>∞ ε1,
C2: 1>∞ ε2,
C3: 1>∞ ε3,
C4: max{ε1, ε2, ε5}>∞ ε4,
C5: 1>∞ ε5.
Note that C2, C3 and C5 are trivially satisfied by virtue of Lemma A.7(b). So, any set
E = {ε1, ε2, ε3, ε4, ε5} of infinitesimals such that C1 and C4 are satisfied is a solution of
C∆; for any such E , the belE built by (7) (in Section 5.1) is an εbf-model of ∆.
Note that in general the C∆ system of constraints does not determine a unique >∞
ordering that must be satisfied by the terms of E . In the example above, any set E ′ such that
ε2 ≈∞ ε3 >∞ ε4 >∞ ε5 >∞ ε1
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satisfies the C∆ constraints; but the same is true for any set E ′′ such that
ε2 ≈∞ ε3 ≈∞ ε5 >∞ ε4 ≈∞ ε1.
This observation suggests that the auto-deduction principle may not constrain the
Bel⊕(∆) family to a sufficient extent, and the consequence relation based on this principle
alone may still be too cautious. The next example shows that this is indeed the case.
Example 3 (Continued). Given the ∆ considered above, we ask the question of whether
or not penguins that have feathers and are birds can fly, that is, whether we can conclude
“f ” or “¬f ” from “p ∧ fa ∧ b”. Clearly, we would like to be able to conclude “¬f ” but
not “f ”. Let belE be any εbf built by (7). By Lemma 9, we have:
plE (p ∧ fa∧ b ∧ f )≈∞ ε4,
plE (p ∧ fa∧ b ∧¬f )≈∞ ε5.
Let |∼ad be the consequence relation based on all the εbf’s in Bel⊕(∆) whose E satisfies
the C∆ constraints. Take bel′ and bel′′ in Bel⊕(∆) respectively built from the two ordered
sets E ′ and E ′′ given above. Both sets satisfy the C∆ constraints. In E ′, we have ε4 >∞ ε5,
and then bel′ gives us “f ” but not “¬f ”. In E ′′, we have ε5 >∞ ε4, and then bel′′ gives us
“¬f ” but not “f ”. Therefore, we have neither p ∧ fa∧ b |∼ad f nor p ∧ fa∧ b |∼ad¬f .
6.2. The least-commitment principle
In the last example, the solution obtained from E ′ is clearly undesirable. Our next step
is to strengthen our constraints by using the least-commitment principle in order to select
only “desirable” sets of infinitesimals. We have already applied this principle in deciding
the form of the individual md ’s in Section 5.1. We now consider a second facet of the
principle, and require that the>∞ ordering between terms of E be ‘minimally committed’.
Defining what counts as a minimally committed ordering requires some care. We shall
consider orderings of the infinitesimals that will be included in a set E such that, on the
induced rule ordering: (i) rules in higher classes are more exceptional than those in lower
class; and (ii) two rules in the same class are not comparable with respect to ‘normality’.
Note that this ordering corresponds to a stratification of ∆ in the sense that it splits ∆
into several strata. To apply the principle of least commitment, then, we shall look for
orderings (stratifications) in which each rule is as uncommitted as possible. In terms of the
infinitesimals in E , this means that εd should belong to the highest possible class, provided
that the auto-deduction constraints are not violated. In the example above, we would prefer
E ′′ to E ′, as ε5 and ε1 are in “higher” classes in E ′′ than in E ′.
Formally, the task consists in building an appropriate E , hence in selecting infinitesimals
that satisfy some constraints based on some >∞ ordering.
Definition 9. Suppose a default base ∆ = {di : i = 1, . . . , n}. Let Z be a set of variables
ζi, i = 1, . . . , n, one per default in ∆. We call these variables ζi proto-infinitesimals
(as infinitesimals will be assigned to them). An interpretation I is a mapping from
proto-infinitesimals to infinitesimals. Let I(ζi) denote the infinitesimal assigned by I to
30 S. Benferhat et al. / Artificial Intelligence 122 (2000) 1–69
the proto-infinitesimals ζi : so I(ζi) ∈ E0. Let I(Z) be the set E = {ε1, . . . , εn} so that
εi = I(ζi) for all ζi in Z.
Definition 10. Let Z= {ζ1, . . . , ζn} be a set of proto-infinitesimals. An ε-stratification of
Z is defined as a partition ξ = {ξ0, . . . , ξm} of Z (partition is used here in the sense that
ξ0 ∪ · · · ∪ ξm = Z, ∀i 6= j , ξi ∩ ξj = ∅ and ∀i, ξi 6= ∅). An interpretation I satisfies an
ε-stratification ξ = {ξ0, . . . , ξm} of Z, written I |= ξ , if for any ζi, ζj in Z with ζi ∈ ξi and
ζj ∈ ξj , i < j implies I(ζi) >∞ I(ζj ).
Intuitively, an ε-stratification induces (through the interpretation that satisfies it) a
ranking of the elements of E by orders of magnitude: all infinitesimals assigned to a
proto-infinitesimal in a class ξi are infinitesimally larger than those assigned to a proto-
infinitesimal in any lower class ξj (i.e., i < j ). If Z is the set of proto-infinitesimals
associated to a default base ∆, any ε-stratification of Z induces a stratification on ∆ by
putting all the rules whose corresponding proto-infinitesimals are in a given class ξi into
the same layer.
Of course, several interpretations can satisfy the same ε-stratification. Furthermore,
nothing is said about the ordering between infinitesimals assigned to the proto-infinitesi-
mals that belong to the same class: their ordering depends on the particular interpretation.
As we shall see below (Example 9), not making these elements equivalent allows us to
avoid some potential problems of syntax dependence.
In general, constraints between infinitesimals should be regarded as constraints over the
possible interpretations I. This is true in particular for the constraints Cd that result from
the auto-deduction principle (Section 6.1). The writing
C1: max{ε2, ε5, ε4}>∞ ε1






For sake of simplicity, however, we keep the simplified writing as used in Section 6.1.
Definition 11. An interpretation I satisfies a set of constraints C∆, written I |= C∆, iff
all the constrains Cd ∈ C∆ are true statements. An ε-stratification ξ of Z satisfies C∆ if
each interpretation I satisfying ξ satisfies C∆. An ε-stratification ξ of Z is compatible
with C∆ if there exists an interpretation satisfying ξ which satisfies C∆.
In general, interpretations that satisfy ε-stratifications which are just compatible with
C∆, but which do not satisfy C∆, do not necessarily make true all the constraints of
C∆. As an example, consider ∆ = {b→ a, s→ a, b ∧ s→¬a} (“if one takes a bath,
he stays alive”, “if one shaves (with an electric razor), he stays alive”, “if one takes a
bath while shaving, he does not stay alive”), and let Z= {ζ1, ζ2, ζ3} be the corresponding
set of proto-infinitesimals. An interpretation I satisfies the auto-deduction constraints C∆
whenever: 1 >∞ I(ζ1), 1 >∞ I(ζ2),I(ζ1)I(ζ2) >∞ I(ζ3). We can check that there are
ε-stratifications of Z which are compatible with C∆ but there is no ε-stratification which
satisfies C∆. This means that the constraints that result from the ε-stratification of Z alone
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cannot guarantee that all C∆ constraints are true statements. Therefore, we also need to
consider the >∞ constraints between terms (i.e., products of elements) of E .
Let us now introduce formally the least committed ε-stratification:
Definition 12. Let Z = {ζ1, . . . , ζn} be a set of proto-infinitesimals, and let ξ =
{ξ0, . . . , ξm} and ξ ′ = {ξ ′0, . . . , ξ ′m′ } be two ε-stratifications of Z. We say that ξ is less
committed than ξ ′ iff, for all ζi ∈ Z, ζi ∈ ξj and ζi ∈ ξ ′k imply j 6 k. We say that ξ is
strictly less committed than ξ ′ if at least one inequality is strict. If P is a family of ε-
stratifications of Z, we call an element ξ of P minimally committed in P if there is no
ξ ′ 6= ξ in P such that ξ ′ is strictly less committed than ξ .
Intuitively, an ε-stratification is less committed than another one if it places the proto-
infinitesimals in classes ξj with a lower index j . The least-commitment principle comes
down to minimizing the number of classes, and to assign as many proto-infinitesimals as
possible to classes with low index. Since by Definition 10 the interpretations of the proto-
infinitesimals in lower classes are larger, using minimally committed ε-stratifications is a
way to capture our informal requirement that the infinitesimals be “as large as possible”.
We are now ready to define our new subclass of Bel⊕(∆). We consider all the
interpretations I of the set Z = {ζ1, . . . , ζn} of proto-infinitesimals so that I satisfies
the auto-deduction constraints C∆. Among these, we consider those that satisfy an ε-
stratification which is minimally committed among those that are compatible with C∆. We
are interested in the εbf’s built by (7) (in Section 5.1) from any such set E ; we denote
by Bellcd(∆) the family of all these εbf’s. The name “lcd” comes from the two main
mechanisms used to build this family: “lc” for the least-commitment principle (applied
twice), and “d” for Dempster’s rule of combination.
Example 3 (Continued). Let E ′ and E ′′ be the two following ε-stratifications: ξ ′ = {ξ ′0 ={ζ2, ζ3}, ξ ′1 = {ζ4}, ξ ′2 = {ζ5}, ξ ′3 = {ζ1}}; and ξ ′′ = {ξ ′′0 = {ζ2, ζ3, ζ5}, ξ ′′1 = {ζ4, ζ1}},
which are compatible with C∆. Of course, these are not the only ε-stratifications that
are compatible with the C∆ constraints in this example (e.g., consider the ε-stratification
ξ ′′′ = {ξ ′′′0 = {ζ2}, ξ ′′′1 = {ζ3}, ξ ′′′2 = {ζ4, ζ5}, ξ ′′′3 = {ζ1}). We can easily check that ξ ′′ is
the only minimally committed one. Indeed, suppose that this was not the case; then there
would exist an ε-stratification ξ = {ξ0, . . . , ξm} where at least either ζ1 or ζ4 is in ξ0, but
this is impossible since any interpretation that satisfies this ε-stratification falsifies either
C1 or C4. The ε-stratification ξ ′′ induces a set of ordering constraints among the terms
tω. Fig. 2 graphically represents these constraints (dashed lines), together with those that
can be deduced from the auto-deduction principle and from the properties of infinitesimals
(solid lines). In the picture, an arrow from t to t ′ means that t >∞ t ′ holds (transitivity
arrows are not drawn).
We summarize the above arguments in the following definition of Bellcd(∆).
Definition 13. Let ∆ be a default base with Z an associated set of proto-infinitesimals
and C∆ the set of constraints induced by ∆. Let P be the set of ε-stratifications of Z
compatible with C∆. Let P∗ be the set of minimally committed elements of P . Let I be
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Fig. 2. Order constraints induced on the terms tω by ξ ′′ in Example 3.
the set of interpretations I of Z that satisfy C∆ and an ε-stratification of Z in P∗. Then we
define Bellcd(∆) to be the set of εbf’s belE such that there exist an I ∈ I and belE is built
from E= I(Z) by (7).
Symbolically, this definition and those underlying it can be written as:
given a default base ∆ = {d :αd → βd} and Z its associated set of proto-
infinitesimals, let
P = {ξ an ε-stratification of Z, ∃I: I |= ξ , I |=C∆},
P∗ = {ξ : ξ ∈ P, 6 ∃ξ ′: ξ ′ ∈ P, ξ ′ strictly less committed than ξ},
I= {I: ∃ξ ∈ P∗, I |= ξ, I |=C∆}
Bellcd(∆)=
{
belE : E = I(Z), I ∈ I, belE induced by m⊕ =
⊕
{md | d ∈∆},
(md(Ω)= εd, md(φd)= 1− εd, md(X)= 0 otherwise)
}
.
This lengthy definition just means that Bellcd(∆) is the set of all εbf’s that can be built
from a set of infinitesimals that are compatible with the constraints imposed by the auto-
deduction principle, and that are “least committed”.
Example 4. Let again ∆ = {b → f,p → ¬f,p → b} be a default base, and Z =
{ζ1, ζ2, ζ3} a corresponding set of proto-infinitesimals. The requirement of auto-deduction
gives us the following three constraints on I:
C1: max{tω | ω |= b ∧ f }>∞ max{tω | ω |= b ∧¬f }, i.e., 1>∞ ε1,
C2: max{tω | ω |= p ∧¬f }>∞ max{tω | ω |= p ∧ f }, i.e., max{ε1, ε3}>∞ ε2,
C3: max{tω | ω |= p ∧ b}>∞ max{tω | ω |= p ∧¬b}, i.e., max{ε1, ε2}>∞ ε3,
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where εi = I(ζi). The constraint 1 >∞ ε1 is always satisfied and using Lemma A.13 the
two last constraints are equivalent to:
C2: ε1 >∞ ε2 or ε3 >∞ ε2,
C3: ε1 >∞ ε3 or ε2 >∞ ε3.
Note that any solution which satisfies C2 and C3 should be such that ε1 >∞ ε2 and
ε1 >∞ ε3. Indeed, assume that ε2 >∞ ε1 (respectively, ε3 >∞ ε1) then to satisfy C2
(respectively C3) we should have ε3 >∞ ε2 (respectively ε2 >∞ ε3), which means that
we should have ε3 >∞ ε1 (respectively ε2 >∞ ε1), and this means the impossibility of
satisfying C3 (respectively C2).
Therefore since any solution should be such that ε1 >∞ ε2 and ε1 >∞ ε3 the two
constraintsC2 andC3 are satisfied, and there is no constraint between ε2 and ε3. Hence, we
only get three ε-stratifications of Z that are compatible with these constraints (depending
on whether ε2 >∞ ε3, ε2 ≈∞ ε3 or ε3 >∞ ε2):
ξ = {{ζ1}, {ζ2, ζ3}},
ξ ′ = {{ζ1}, {ζ2}, {ζ3}},
ξ ′′ = {{ζ1}, {ζ3}, {ζ2}}.
It is easy to see that ξ is strictly less committed than both ξ ′ and ξ ′′—intuitively, this is
because ξ does not impose any unnecessary order between ζ2 and ζ3. So, ξ is the only
minimally committed ε-stratification. Any interpretation that satisfies the ε-stratification ξ
produces a set E such that ε1 >∞ ε2, ε1 >∞ ε3 and there is no constraint between ε2 and
ε3. Any such E is also compatible with the C∆ constraints. Thus, the set Bellcd(∆) consists
of all the εbf’s in Bel⊕(∆) built from such E’s.
6.3. The LCD consequence relation
We define our new consequence relation using the elements in Bellcd(∆). It is easy to see
that the Bellcd(∆) set “behaves well” for this goal. First, Bellcd(∆) is a subset of EBF(∆),
that is, any element of Bellcd(∆) is an εbf-model of ∆: this is true by construction, since
any element of Bellcd(∆) must satisfy the auto-deduction constraints. Second, Bellcd(∆) is
a proper subset of EBF(∆): for example, consider any εbf in Bel⊕(∆) obtained by the ξ ′
partition in Example 3; this εbf satisfies the C∆ constraints, hence it belongs to EBF(∆),
but it is not in Bellcd(∆) because ξ ′ is not minimally committed. Third, if the default
base ∆ is consistent, then Bellcd(∆) is non-empty. To see this, take the E defined for the
penalty order in Section 5.2 (or, for that matter, any of the approaches in Section 5): if ∆
is consistent, this E satisfies the C∆ constraints (because |∼pen is auto-deductive), and then
the εbf built by (7) from this E belongs to Bellcd(∆).
We put Bellcd(∆) inside (10) (Section 5.1) to obtain our new definition of consequence
relation. We name LCD this consequence relation, and denote it by |∼lcd.
α |∼lcd β iff for any belE in Bellcd(∆),belE |= α→ β.
Example 4 (Continued). It is immediate to verify that LCD correctly addresses the
classical penguin problem. Let belE be any element of Bellcd(∆). From Lemma 9,
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plE (b∧p∧f )≈∞ ε2 and plE (b∧p∧¬f )≈∞ ε1. We have seen above that, for any belE
in Bellcd(∆), the set E must be such that ε1 >∞ ε2. Hence, b ∧ p |∼lcd¬f as expected.
In practice, the algorithm needed to determine if α |∼lcd β requires only the knowledge
of the >∞ relation between the εi ’s of E and some terms (products) built from these
εi’s. It consists in constructing the constraints C∆, building the set P of ε-stratifications
compatible with C∆, finding in P the set P∗ of minimally committed ε-stratifications,
finding the >∞ inequalities that must be satisfied. Building explicitly the set of belE is not
necessary.
For notation simplicity, we write the inequalities constraints that result from C∆ and
the ε-stratification using εi symbols, with the understanding that they denote proto-
infinitesimals to which infinitesimals will be assigned, infinitesimals that will satisfy all
the inequalities.
When the >∞ inequalities cannot determine if t1 >∞ t2 or t2 >∞ t1 or t1 ≈∞ t2, we
denote this indeterminacy by t1 ∼∞ t2, meaning that each of the three relations can be
obtained from some interpretation used to build Bellcd(∆).
An important property of LCD is that, if both ∆ and the alphabet of L underlying ∆
are finite, then LCD consequence is decidable. To see this, first notice that if ∆ is finite,
so is Z. We can then enumerate all the ε-stratifications of Z, select those that satisfy the
C∆ constraints (which are finite), and select among these the ones which are minimally
committed. Second, as the number of propositional variables is finite, so is the number
of possible truth assignments ω. Then, the set of all tω terms is also finite. Thus, we can
enumerate all the possible>∞ orderings on this set, and select those that: (i) satisfy theC∆
constraints, and (ii) are consistent with some of the ε-stratifications selected above. Finally,
in order to check if α |∼lcd β , we need to check that maxω|=α∧β tω >∞ maxω|=α∧¬β tω holds
for all the orderings between terms so selected. We have so proved the following:
Theorem 7. Let L be a propositional language on a finite alphabet, and ∆ a default base
on L. Then, the |∼lcd relation is decidable.
The definition of effective technique to compute the set of LCD consequences is left for
further research. Here, we only give two brief comments on the computation of the least
committed stratifications and the computation of the plausible consequences once the least
committed stratifications are computed.
Concerning the first point, we emphasize that in our approach the constraints are directly
given on infinitesimals, and therefore the number of variables involved in the constraints
is at most equal to |∆|. This means that it is always possible to make explicit the optimal
solutions since the size of the solution is not very large. In the preferential model-based
approach to default reasoning, by contrast the constraints are often given on the set of
interpretations, and the size of solutions is very large.
Concerning the second point, the LCD entailment is defined at the semantical level,
hence looking for the syntactic counterpart is an important point. One possible way to find
syntactic counterparts is to explore the compilation techniques developed by Benferhat
et al. [5]. Their work provides a syntactic inference for reasoning from stratified knowl-
edge bases Σ using utilitarist semantics (like the one based on penalty logic). The idea
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is to transform Σ into a new knowledge base Σ ′ such that if we apply the egalitarist se-
mantics (like the one based on possibilistic logic) on Σ ′ we get the same results as if we
apply the utilitarist semantics on Σ , and hence we can use the syntactic inference from
the approaches based on egalitarist semantics. Exploring this possibility is part of our fu-
ture work.
7. Analysis of the LCD consequence relation
We now study in more detail the patterns of reasoning which are captured by LCD. To
do this, we consider the desiderata listed in the Introduction, and show how LCD addresses
them.
7.1. Rationality and specificity
The fact that LCD respects the principle of specificity was illustrated by Example 4. It
is easy to see that it also respects the KLM postulates of rationality [31]. In fact, all the
elements of Bellcd(∆) are εbf-models of ∆, thus the LCD relation is at least as strong as
|∼bf, and therefore it satisfies the KLM properties by Theorem 1. We have thus proved the
following.
Lemma 14. If α |∼P β then α |∼lcd β .
The converse of the previous lemma is false (see Section 7.2 for a counterexample).
So, LCD is strictly stronger that P . The KLM postulates are commonly accepted as the
minimal core of any system of non-monotonic inference. Another rule that has found wide,
although not unanimous consensus, is the rule of rational monotonicity:
α |∼β α 6|∼¬γ
α ∧ γ |∼β
This rule has been originally proposed by Lehmann [33] as a candidate rule for minimizing
the amount of information lost when we add a new consistent item of information γ to a
pre-existing α. Although no definite reason has been given for the necessity of this rule in
a non-monotonic reasoning system, rational monotonicity is usually regarded as desirable,
and it is validated by many current extensions of system P ; two notable exceptions are
Brewka’s system and Geffner’s conditional entailment. LCD also fails to satisfy this rule,
as shown by our next example.
Example 5. Let ∆ = {b→f, p→¬f, p→ b, m→f, y→f }, where the first three
defaults are as in Example 2, and the two last rules mean “Generally, objects with metal-
wings fly” and “Generally, Yogis fly”. The constraints induced by ∆ are:
C1: max{tω | ω |= b ∧ f }>∞ max{tω | ω |= b ∧¬f }, i.e., 1>∞ ε1,
C2: max{tω | ω |= p ∧¬f }>∞ max{tω | ω |= p ∧ f }, i.e., max{ε1, ε3}>∞ ε2,
C3: max{tω | ω |= p ∧ b}>∞ max{tω | ω |= p ∧¬b}, i.e., max{ε1, ε2}>∞ ε3,
C4: max{tω | ω |=m∧ f }>∞ max{tω | ω |=m∧¬f }, i.e., 1>∞ ε4,
C5: max{tω | ω |= y ∧ f }>∞ max{tω | ω |= y ∧¬f }, i.e., 1>∞ ε5.
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There is one minimally committed partition that satisfies the auto-deduction constraints,
given by ξ = {{ε1, ε4, ε5}, {ε2, ε3}}. From this, we see that:
(i) We have b ∧ p ∧m |∼lcd¬y ∨ f . In fact, for any bel in Bellcd:
pl
(
b ∧ p ∧m∧ (¬y ∨ f ))
≈∞ max
{
pl(b ∧ p ∧m∧¬y ∧ f ),
pl(b ∧ p ∧m∧¬y ∧¬f ),pl(b ∧ p ∧m∧ y ∧¬f )}
≈∞ max{ε2, ε1ε4, ε2};
pl
(
b ∧ p ∧m∧ y ∧¬f )≈∞ ε1ε4ε5;
and
ε1ε4 >∞ ε1ε4ε5.
(ii) We do not have b ∧ p ∧m |∼lcd¬y . In fact, for any bel in Bellcd:
pl(b ∧ p ∧m∧¬y)
≈∞ max
{
pl(b ∧ p ∧m∧¬y ∧ f ),pl(b ∧ p ∧m∧¬y ∧¬f )}
≈∞ max{ε2, ε1ε4};
pl(b ∧ p ∧m∧ y)
≈∞ max
{





and ε2 ∼∞ ε1ε4 since from the partition ξ = {{ε1, ε4, ε5}, {ε2, ε3}} we can neither
deduce ε2 >∞ ε1ε4 nor ε1ε4 >∞ ε2.
(iii) From (i) and (ii), according to the rule of rational monotonicity we should have
b ∧ p ∧ m ∧ y |∼lcd¬y ∨ f . However, this is not the case. In fact, for any bel in
Bellcd:
pl(b ∧ p ∧m∧ y ∧ f )= ε2,
pl(b ∧ p ∧m∧ y ∧¬f )= ε1ε4ε5,
and
ε2 ∼∞ ε1ε4ε5.
The failure of LCD to satisfy rational monotonicity should not be seen as a drawback, but
as an indication that rational monotonicity does not necessarily apply to all situations. The
last example provides a case where the conclusions produced by LCD could be regarded
as more intuitively acceptable than those produced by accepting rational monotonicity. To
see why, consider the context “b ∧ p ∧ m”—that is, consider an individual who is both
b, p and m. It is reasonable to expect that neither y nor ¬y can be derived in this context.
Similarly, it is reasonable to expect neither f nor ¬f to be derived. However, we should
expect to have ¬y ∨ f . In fact, either the individual flies or it does not. If it does, we have
trivially ¬y ∨f ; and if it does not, then it cannot be a Yogi, and we again have ¬y ∨f . As
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we have seen, all these results are indeed produced by LCD. 11 Consider now the extended
context “b ∧ p ∧ m ∧ y”, where we also know that the individual is a Yogi. LCD does
not produce the inference b ∧ p ∧m ∧ y |∼¬y ∨ f , thus violating rational monotonicity.
But this is again a reasonable behavior, since we have y in the premises, and we have no
reason to infer f . Interestingly, the use of rational monotonicity in this example is even
more questionable if we use it in combination with the other rules of system P . In fact,
we have (by Reflexivity and Right Weakening) b∧p∧m∧ y |∼y; and from this and from
b ∧ p ∧m ∧ y |∼¬y ∨ f we have (by And) b ∧ p ∧m ∧ y |∼f , whose intuitive validity
can be easily challenged.
7.2. Irrelevance
The following example shows that LCD correctly addresses the irrelevance problem.
Example 4 (Continued). Let ∆ be as above, and consider a new property “red” (r)
unrelated to b, p and f . We expect that red birds fly (recall that this is not the case in
system P , that is, b ∧ r 6|∼P f ). For any bel in Bellcd, we have (we apply Lemmas 3, 9, and
A.12)
pl(b ∧ r ∧ f )≈∞ max
{
pl(b ∧ r ∧ f ∧ p),pl(b ∧ r ∧ f ∧¬p)}
≈∞ max{ε2,1} ≈∞ 1,
pl(b ∧ r ∧¬f )≈∞ max
{
pl(b ∧ r ∧¬f ∧ p),pl(b ∧ r ∧¬f ∧¬p)}
≈∞ max{ε1, ε1} ≈∞ ε1.
As any εbf must satisfy 1>∞ ε1 by Lemma A.7(b), we have pl(b ∧ r ∧ f ) >∞ pl(b∧ r ∧
¬f ), which implies b ∧ r |∼lcd f as desired.
We can prove that LCD correctly addresses the irrelevance problem in general. Let In(∆)
be the set of propositional symbols which appear in ∆ and Out(∆) = V − In(∆) be the
set of propositional symbols which do not appear in ∆, where V denotes the set of all
propositional symbols of the language. In Example 4, we have V = {p,b,f, r}, In(∆) =
{p,b,f },Out(∆) = {r}. Let Lout(∆) be the set of all propositional formulas composed
of propositional symbols which do not appear in ∆, and let Lin(∆) be the set of all
propositional formulas composed of propositional symbols which appear in ∆.
Lemma 15. Let δ ∈Lout(∆) and α,β ∈ Lin(∆). Then α |∼lcd β implies α ∧ δ |∼lcd β .
11 These arguments depend on the assumed dependence relation between p and y. For instance if y and p denote
equivalent propositions then inferring ¬y∨f is controversial. LCD regards propositions for which there is not an
explicitly stated relation in the database as being independent—this is a common implicit assumption in logical
systems. In our case, all we know about y is that it flies; as we have no information to infer a relation between
p and y, we assume they are independent. Thus, knowing that an individual does not fly, we plausibly prefer to
deduce that it is not a y rather than an exceptional y.
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7.3. Blocking of inheritance
Several systems, including Pearl’s system Z, suffer from the problem of inheritance
blocking: if a class C contains a property p that conflicts with the one inherited from a
super-class C′, than no property at all is inherited from C′ (even properties unrelated to p).
The canonical example is built by adding to the usual penguin problem the default b→ l
(read “generally, birds have legs”). From this, system Z cannot deduce that penguins have
legs too, i.e., p 6|∼Z l. 12 The next two examples show that LCD does not suffer from this
problem.
Example 6. Let ∆ = {b→f, p→¬f, p→ b, b→ l}, and let E = {ε1, ε2, ε3, ε4} be
the associated infinitesimals. Let bel be any element of Bellcd(∆). The constraints that bel
must satisfy are the same as in Example 4, plus
C4: max
{
pl(ω) | ω |= b ∧ l}>∞ max{pl(ω) | ω |= b ∧¬l}, i.e., 1>∞ ε4.
It is easy to verify that the following is the only minimally committed partition satisfying
these constraints: ξ = {{ε1, ε4}, {ε2, ε3}}. To see if penguins have legs, note that
pl(p ∧ l)≈∞ max
{
pl(p ∧ l ∧ b ∧ f ),pl(p ∧ l ∧ b ∧¬f ),pl(p ∧ l ∧¬b ∧ f ),
pl(p ∧ l ∧¬b ∧¬f )}
≈∞ max{ε2, ε1, ε2ε3, ε2} ≈∞ ε1
pl(p ∧¬l)≈∞ max
{
pl(p ∧¬l ∧ b ∧ f ),pl(p ∧¬l ∧ b ∧¬f ),
pl(p ∧¬l ∧¬b ∧ f ),pl(p ∧¬l ∧¬b ∧¬f )}
≈∞ max{ε2ε4, ε1ε4, ε2ε3ε4, ε2ε4} ≈∞ ε1ε4.
Therefore, pl(p ∧ l) >∞ pl(p ∧¬l), which implies p |∼lcd l as desired.
Example 7. Consider the defaults “Generally, Swedes are blond” and “Generally, Swedes
are tall”, represented by ∆ = {s→ b, s→ t}. What can be said about short Swedes? It
seems reasonable to expect that they are still blond. The two auto-deduction constraints
are 1>∞ ε1 and 1>∞ ε2, which are always satisfied by Lemma A.7(b). Hence, all terms
are free, and by the least-commitment principle we put them all in a single class; that is,
we have a single least-committed partition: ξ = {{ε1, ε2}}. For any bel in Bellcd(∆),
pl(s ∧¬t ∧ b)≈∞ ε1, pl(s ∧¬t ∧¬b)≈∞ ε1ε2,
and since ε1 >∞ ε1ε2 by Lemma A.8(c), we conclude that short Swedes are blond, i.e.,
s ∧¬t |∼lcd b. Notice that this result does not follow in Z.
We can generalize the above examples, and show that, in a given context α, all the
defaults in the subset Free(∆ ∪ {α}) of ∆ which are not responsible for the inconsistency
12 Goldszmidt and Pearl [24] have suggested an extension ofZ, called Z+, which correctly handles this example.
Unfortunately, Z+ does not solve the problem of inheritance blocking in general: if we add the rule “Generally,
legless birds do not have legs” to our base, then Z+ cannot deduce both of “Legless birds fly” and “Penguins
have legs”—it will just deduce one of them, depending on the ranking. This problem does not appear in LCD.
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can be used in the inference process. The subset Free(∆ ∪ {α}) is unique and is formally
defined in the following way:
Free
(
∆∪ {α})= {β→ γ ∈∆ |6 ∃A⊆∆,A minimally inconsistent with α, and
β→ γ ∈A}
where A⊆∆ is minimally inconsistent with α iff:
• α ∧ φA `⊥;
• ∀β→ γ ∈A, α ∧ φA−{β→γ } 6` ⊥.
Lemma 16. If α ∧ Free(∆∪ {α}) ` β then α |∼lcd β .
Note that Lemma 16 does not hold for system Z: Example 6 above provides a simple
counterexample (where b→ l belongs to Free(∆∪ {p})).
7.4. Ambiguity preservation
The next desideratum listed in the introduction is the ability to stay uncommitted in cases
of ambiguity. The following example shows a case of ambiguity where system Z would
deduce an undesired result, while LCD does not.
Example 8. Let ∆ = {b→f, p→¬f, p→ b, m→f }, where the last default means
“Generally, objects with metal wings fly”. The constraints that the elements of Bellcd(∆)
must satisfy are the three in Example 4, plus
C4: max
{
pl(ω) | ω |=m∧ f }>∞ max{pl(ω) | ω |=m∧¬f }, i.e., 1>∞ ε4.
We get the same partition as in Example 6: ξ = {{ε1, ε4}, {ε2, ε3}}. Consider now a bird
that is a penguin and has metal wings (sic). Given the base ∆, we should not be able to say
whether or not this beast will fly—we are in a case of ambiguity. We have indeed:
pl(b ∧ p ∧m∧ f )≈∞ ε2,
pl(b ∧ p ∧m∧¬f )≈∞ ε1ε4.
As the ξ partition says nothing about the relative magnitude of ε2 and ε1ε4, we have neither
b ∧ p ∧ m |∼lcd f nor b ∧ p ∧ m |∼lcd¬f . Notice, by contrast, that Z would give us the
arbitrary result b ∧ p ∧m |∼Z¬f .
7.5. Syntax sensitivity
The last desideratum in our list is syntax independence. Some of the existing systems
that go beyond system P do not satisfy this requirement: for instance, in the lexicographic
approach, discussed in Section 5.3, repetitions of the same default in ∆ may change the
result. The following example shows that LCD is not sensitive to these duplications.
Example 9. Consider a variant of the Quaker–Republican problem where the rule
“Generally, Quakers are pacifists” has been duplicated: ∆ = {q→p, q→p, r→¬p}.
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By using the lexicographic approach, we would have q ∧ r |∼p, while we would prefer to
acknowledge the ambiguity and deduce nothing. In LCD, we have the constraints
C1: max
{
pl(ω) | ω |= q ∧ p}>∞ max{pl(ω) | ω |= q ∧¬p}, i.e., 1>∞ ε1ε2,
C2: max
{
pl(ω) | ω |= q ∧ p}>∞ max{pl(ω) | ω |= q ∧¬p}, i.e., 1>∞ ε1ε2,
C3: max
{
pl(ω) | ω |= r ∧¬p}>∞ max{pl(ω) | ω |= r ∧ p}, i.e., 1>∞ ε3.
Using the least-commitment principle, we get the one class partition {{ε1, ε2, ε3}}. Then
pl(q ∧ r ∧ p)≈∞ ε3, pl(q ∧ r ∧¬p)≈∞ ε1ε2,
and we have neither q ∧ r |∼lcd p nor q ∧ r |∼lcd¬p, as desired. It is important to note
that, if we considered infinitesimals in the same class as being equivalent (≈∞) rather than
unconstrained (∼∞), then the ambiguity would not be preserved, and our consequence
relation would be sensitive to duplications—in fact, we would have ε3 >∞ ε1ε2 by
Lemmas A.8(c) and A.9(b), and hence q ∧ r |∼lcdp.
It is easy to realize that LCD is not sensitive to duplications in general. In fact,
any two instances of the same default, say d1 = α → β and d2 = α → β , with the
associated infinitesimals ε1 and ε2, behave as one default d3 = α→ β with the associated
infinitesimal ε3 = ε1ε2: in the auto-deduction constraints, ε1 and ε2 will always appear or
not appear simultaneously in each term, and can then be uniformly replaced by ε3.
The following example shows that LCD consequence is not sensitive to the number of
different rules in a default base that support the same conclusion
Example 10. Consider the Quaker–Republican problem with the extra rule “Generally,
ecologists are pacifist”: ∆= {q→p, r→¬p, e→p}. The constraints are
C1: max
{
pl(ω) | ω |= q ∧ p}>∞ max{pl(ω) | ω |= q ∧¬p}, i.e., 1>∞ ε1,
C2: max
{
pl(ω) | ω |= r ∧¬p}>∞ max{pl(ω) | ω |= r ∧ p}, i.e., 1>∞ ε2,
C3: max
{
pl(ω) | ω |= e∧ p}>∞ max{pl(ω) | ω |= e ∧¬p}, i.e., 1>∞ ε3,
and we get again the one class least-committed partition ξ = {{ε1, ε2, ε3}}. Then,
pl(q ∧ e ∧ r ∧ p)≈∞ ε2 and pl(q ∧ e ∧ r ∧¬p)≈∞ ε1ε3.
Since ε2 is not comparable with ε1ε3 according to ξ , LCD does not deduce that ecologists
who are both Quakers and Republicans are pacifists, nor that they are not pacifists.
8. LCD and the other systems
The following theorem summarizes the relation between LCD and system P .
Theorem 8. For a given ∆, if α |∼P β then α |∼lcd β . The converse is not true.
Proof. Lemma 14 proves the inclusion. The examples given in Section 7.2 show that the
inclusion is proper. 2
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We now study the relation between LCD and the systems considered in Section 5.
All these systems include a stratification of the default base that essentially corresponds
to the one used in system Z. What makes the systems different is the way in which
this stratification is used to decide entailment. LCD also gives rise to a stratification of
the rules in the base, which is directly obtained from the partition of the corresponding
infinitesimals: for example, the partition {{ε2, ε3}, {ε1, ε4}} of E corresponds to the
stratification {{d2, d3}, {d1, d4}} of ∆. However, and importantly, the stratification
produced by LCD is not necessarily the same as the one produced by system Z. The
following example supports this claim.
Example 11. Consider the set of defaults: ∆= {T → a, y→¬a ∧ c, y ∧ s→¬c} where
T denotes the tautology, and let E = {ε1, ε2, ε3} be the set of associated infinitesimals.
Both system Z and all of the systems considered in Section 5 stratify∆ by considering that
d1 = T → a is less prioritary than d2 = y→¬a ∧ c, and that the latter is less prioritary
than d3 = y ∧ s→¬c. That is, we have the stratification S = {{d1}, {d2}, {d3}}. In the case
of LCD, we have the following constraints:
C1: max
{
pl(ω) | ω |= a}>∞ max{pl(ω) | ω |= ¬a}, i.e., 1>∞ ε1,
C2: max
{
pl(ω) | ω |= y ∧¬a ∧ c}
>∞ max
{
pl(ω) | ω |= y ∧ (a ∨¬c)}, i.e., ε1 >∞ ε2,
C3: max
{
pl(ω) | ω |= y ∧ s ∧¬c}
>∞ max
{
pl(ω) | ω |= y ∧ s ∧ c}, i.e., ε2 >∞ max{ε3ε1, ε3ε2}.
By virtue of C2 the last constraint simplifies to
C′3: ε2 >∞ ε3ε1.
Then, the least-commitment principle gives the partition ξ = {{ε1, ε3}, {ε2}}. This solution
corresponds to the stratification S′ = {{d1, d3}, {d2}}, which is different from S.
An immediate consequence of this difference is that LCD may produce results that are
different from those of all the other systems. Consider the question of deciding whether or
not c follows from y ∧ s ∧ ¬a given the ∆ in the example. All of |∼pen, |∼G, |∼lex and
|∼B can infer ¬c from y ∧ s ∧ ¬a. Roughly, in the presence of the fact y ∧ s ∧ ¬a, we
apply the rule which is most prioritary according to S, that is d3, and hence we infer ¬c.
By contrast, in LCD we need to compare
pl(y ∧ s ∧¬a ∧ c)≈∞ ε1ε3, and
pl(y ∧ s ∧¬a ∧¬c)≈∞ ε1ε2.
Given the least-committed partition above, and by the properties of infinitesimals, we get
ε1ε3 >∞ ε1ε2, and then y ∧ s ∧¬a |∼lcd c. This immediately gives us the following.
Theorem 9. The LCD consequence is incomparable to all of Pearl’s system Z, Brewka’s
preferred subtheories, Geffner’s conditional entailment, Pinkas’ penalty logic, and the
lexicographic approach.
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Proof. Examples 5 and 6 provide counterexamples to both inclusions betweenZ and LCD.
The last example above shows incomparability between LCD and the other systems. 2
The last example also shows an important fact, which did not show up in our previous
examples: the stratification of E alone does not guarantee that the C∆ constraints will be
satisfied. For instance, C2 is not satisfied if we only use the stratification given by the least-
committed principle. As we have discussed above, LCD-entailment also considers the >∞
constraints between terms of E (i.e., products of elements) which are induced by C∆. The
previous example shows that the ordering constraints between terms cannot be disposed of.
It is not easy to say which one of the two conclusions c or ¬c is more intuitive in the last
example. This mainly depends on the dependence relation between the two properties a and
c when y is true. LCD regards these two properties as dependent referring to the second rule
of ∆. In a sense, mentioning both properties in the same rule is taken as a sign that if y is
exceptional for one property, then this is also (plausibly) the case for the other property, and
conversely. Note that if we split d2 into two rules y→ c and y→¬a then LCD infers ¬c.
Intuitively, the two properties a and c are now considered independent: if y is exceptional
with respect to one property, it is not necessarily so for the second property as well.
At first sight, it might seem that the solution provided by LCD violates the specificity
requirement, since d3 is the most specific rule in ∆ which applies to y ∧ s ∧ ¬a, and d3
entails¬c. The situation, however, is more complex. Consider the new base∆∗ =∆∪{d4},
where d4 = y∧¬a→¬a∧c.∆ and∆∗ deduce the same properties about c in LCD, since
the least-commitment principle gives for∆∗ the partition ξ = {{ε1, ε3, ε4}, {ε2}}. However,
the specificity principle cannot help us in deciding between c and ¬c in this case: d3 would
lead to ¬c, while d4 to c, and each one of d3 and d4 can be considered as the ‘most specific
rule’ for y ∧ s ∧¬a. In fact, the specificity principle is clearly defined for antecedents and
consequents that are literals [60] which is not the case in this example.
The intuitive acceptability of the deductions performed is an important criterion to
judge a formal system for commonsense reasoning. The examples in the last sections have
shown cases where the conclusion provided by LCD is more intuitively acceptable than
those provided by the Z, Brewka’s, Pinkas’, and lexicographic systems. We now show a
case where LCD allows to infer a desirable conclusion that is not provided by Geffner’s
conditional entailment.
Example 12. Consider the set of defaults: ∆ = {p→ mb ∨ fb, mb→f, fb→f, p→
¬f }, where p,mb, fb, and f respectively stand for penguin, male bird, female bird,
and flies. Let then E = {ε1, ε2, ε3, ε4} be the set of associated infinitesimals. We wonder
whether Tweety, who is a penguin and a female bird but not a male bird, can fly or not—
clearly, we expect her not to fly.
Geffner’s conditional entailment does not infer that “Tweety does not fly”. To show this,
it is enough to find an admissible prioritized structure where the conclusion does not follow.
Note that the preference relation
d1 >∆ d3 >∆ d4 >∆ d2,
where di denotes the ith default in ∆, is admissible for∆. Let then ω = p∧¬mb∧ fb∧ f
and ω′ = p ∧¬mb∧ fb∧¬f . Both interpretations satisfy d1 and d2, but while ω satisfies
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d3 and falsifies d4, ω′ satisfies d4 and falsifies d3. As d3 >∆ d4, we have ω >Ω ω′. But f
is true in ω, and hence ¬f cannot be deduced in the given prioritized structure.
Let us now see what happens with LCD. It is easy to see that the least-commitment
principle gives the partition: ξ = {{ε2, ε3}, {ε1, ε4}}. We have
pl(p ∧¬mb∧ fb∧ f )≈∞ ε4, and
pl(p ∧¬mb∧ fb∧¬f )≈∞ ε3.
Since ξ sanctions that ε3 >∞ ε4, then p ∧ ¬mb ∧ fb |∼lcd¬f as desired. (Note that this
result is also provided by Z and the other systems above; the reason why Geffner’s system
is more cautious in this example is that there are several admissible orders.)
We now briefly compare LCD with Reiter’s default logic DL. We only consider normal
default logic since in our approach we do not consider default rules of the general form
α : β
γ
. The following example shows that LCD and DL have different behaviors when
confronted with an inconsistent set of defaults. Inconsistency here is understood in the
sense of Pearl [39] (or Adams).
Example 13 [36]. Let ∆ = {T → x, x ∨ y → ¬x} and W = ∅. This default base is
classically inconsistent. With LCD, we cannot work with this base, as the constraints are
ε1 >∞ ε2 and ε2 >∞ ε1 and no partition satisfies them. In DL, on the contrary, we have
one extension, from which x is obtained.
DL does not use a specificity criterion to prefer one extension over the other. In the
penguin example, with ∆= {p→ b, b→f, p→¬f }, DL does neither infer f nor ¬f
from p. Thus, DL does not satisfy the auto-deductivity principle. Variants of DL have been
proposed that rectify this shortcoming. For instance, Delgrande and Schaub [11], inspired
by Reiter and Criscuolo [44], transform rules whose antecedents are in a general class into
semi-normal defaults, while leaving specific rules unchanged, and use semi-normal default
logic to make inferences. This extension remains more cautious than LCD in some cases.
For example, let ∆= {x→ y},W = {¬y}, and suppose {¬y,¬x ∨ y} is consistent; then,
we do not get ¬x in Delgrande and Schaub’s system, while ¬x follows from ¬y in LCD.
The following theorem summarizes the relation between DL and LCD.
Theorem 10. LCD consequence is incomparable with DL.
Proof. As discussed above, in the penguin triangle LCD produces a deduction that is not
in DL. Example 13 shows a case where the opposite is true. 2
LCD is also different from the maximum entropy approach for default reasoning
proposed in [23]. Let Aε be the class of probability distributions considered in Section 2.2,
namely the class of probability distributions, which are compatible with ∆. The idea in the
maximum entropy approach is that, instead of considering all the probability distributions
in Aε as it is done in system P , we select one probability distribution, denoted by P∗,
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Goldszmidt [23] proposes a semantical algorithm in the same spirit as system Z to compute
the inference relation based on P∗. The maximal entropy approach partially solves the
irrelevance and blocking property inheritance problems. However, it does not solve the
ambiguity problem presented in Example 8. Moreover, the algorithm proposed for the
maximum entropy approach only deals with default bases which are minimal core sets
defined by:
Definition 14. A set ∆ is said to be a “minimal core set” if for each default α→ β of
∆,α ∧¬β ∧ φ∆−{α→β} is consistent (in the sense of classical logic).
The default bases that contain redundant information are not minimal core sets.
Bourne and Parsons [8] have solved the problem of restricting to minimal core sets,
by adding explicit variable strengths on each default. This extension is very close to
system Z+ [24,25]. In fact in both systems, the strength s associated to a default p→ q
corresponds to a constraint on the admissible rankings defined on the set of interpretations.
This constraint says that the rank associated to the best world satisfying p ∧ q should be
smaller by at least s than the best world satisfying p ∧ ¬q (note that both systems use
Spohn’s kappa functions to rank order interpretations, so interpretations with low ranks are
preferred). The difference between system Z+ and Bourne and Parsons’ proposal is in the
definition of the rank associated to interpretations: one uses the maximum operator while
the other uses addition.
Bourne and Parsons approach is also incomparable to LCD. The strength associated to
defaults in Bourne and Parsons’ system are set by the user, and there are no constraints
between defaults. The set of plausible conclusions in their system therefore depends on the
choice of those strengths. Notice that the “naive” least-committed solution of assigning
the same rank to all defaults would produce some undesirable effects in this system:
redundancies in the default base would not be well addressed, and considering all possible
admissible assignments would result in inferences which are too cautious.
Perhaps the closest relative of LCD is the system proposed by Wilson [63,64]. Wilson
also uses belief functions to give semantics to default reasoning, but he is mainly interested
in establishing a strong link between belief functions and DL. Very roughly, Wilson’s
approach can be summarized in three steps as follows (see [64], for more details). The first
step is to provide a new definition of what constitutes an extension (called M-extension) of
a default theory. Given a default theory (∆,W) on a language L and a subset ∆′ ⊆ ∆,
Wilson first defines Cn∆′(W) as the intersection off all Γ ⊆ L such that: (i) W ⊆ Γ ,
(ii) Cn(Γ )= Γ , and (iii) if α : β
γ
∈∆′ and α ∈ Γ then γ ∈ Γ . Next, he defines a subbase∆′
to be ∆-consistent iff for all α : β
γ
∈∆′,¬β /∈ Cn∆′(W). Finally, a set of closed formulasE
is said to be an M-extension of (∆,W) iff there exists a maximally∆-consistent subbase∆′
such that E = Cn∆′(W). Wilson [64] shows that each default theory has an M-extension.
The second step in Wilson’s construction is to introduce the notion of B-extensions in
what he calls the Sources of Evidence Framework [63]. In this framework, we consider
a number of sources Si , each of which gives us a piece of evidence. A source and its
evidence correspond to a simple support function. Let a = (a1, . . . , am) be the vector of
real numbers representing the reliabilities of the sources, and let X = {xI : I ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}}
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where xI represents the event that the sources Si are reliable for i ∈ I and the others
are unreliable. An SE-structure is defined to be a function K :X → 2L such that for
I, J ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} if J ⊆ I then K(xJ ) is consistent whenever K(xI ) is consistent. He
then defines a probability measure on X, in a similar way as our Eq. (7) (Section 5.1).
Finally, he defines a B-extension of a given SE-structure K as, roughly speaking, the set
of propositions whose beliefs tend to 1, when the reliabilities ai are pushed in such a way
that the belief of all formulas tend to either 0 or 1.
The last step in Wilson’s proposal is to show how M-extensions of a default theory
can be captured in evidence theory via the Sources of Evidence Framework. The idea
is to view each default rule αi : βi
γi
as a source of information Si which provides two
pieces of information αi : γi
γi
and ¬βi :⊥⊥ . He shows that a set of closed formulas E is
an M-extension of ∆ iff E is a B-extension of the SE-structure K∆ defined by, for
I ⊆ {1, . . . ,m},K∆(xI )= Cn∆′(W) where ∆′ = {di ∈∆, i ∈ I }.
The main common point between Wilson’s approach and our proposal is that we both
represent default rules as limits of belief functions. Moreover the two approaches view
each default rule as being one item of evidence provided by one of several sources of
information. However, the two approaches mainly differ in the fact that Wilson’s approach
captures a variant of Reiter’s default logic while in our approach we recover (and also
propose) several recent systems which deal with conditional assertions in the sense of
Adams [2] or Lehmann and Magidor [35]. This means that the two approaches can be
viewed, in some sense, as complementary.
9. Conclusions
We have shown that we can use (a special class of) belief functions to give semantics
to default rules, and to define several notions of non-monotonic consequence. Table 2
summarizes our results. The first row lists the seven systems presented in Section 3 ( |∼bf),
Section 4 ( |∼lc), Section 5 ( |∼⊕1, |∼⊕2, |∼⊕3 and |∼⊕4), and Section 6 ( |∼lcd), respectively.
The second row lists existing systems for which we have proved equivalence with one
of our systems. To this respect, the use of ε-belief functions and of Dempster’s rule of
combination can be seen as a uniform framework for defining non-monotonic consequence
relations. This framework allowed us to capture several of the systems proposed in the
literature; we speculate that it can also be used to model other non-monotonic systems.
The next rows in the table refer to the properties commonly regarded as desirable for a
non-monotonic consequence relation. LCD satisfies all of these properties except rational
monotony. More specifically, it satisfies the rationality postulates of Kraus, Lehmann and
Magidor (Theorem 9); it correctly addresses the problems of irrelevance (Example 4
and Lemma 15), of blocking of inheritance (Example 6 and Lemma 16), of ambiguity
(Example 8), and of redundancy (Example 9); and it is not sensitive to the number of
different rules in a default base that support the same conclusion (Example 10). This
good behavior is shared by Geffner’s conditional entailment; however, LCD may give
more intuitively acceptable conclusions in some cases (Example 12). Interestingly, both
LCD and Geffner’s system exhibit this good behavior without having to satisfy rational
monotonicity.
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Table 2
The εbf-based systems and other non-monotonic systems
|∼bf |∼lc |∼⊕1 |∼⊕2 |∼⊕3 |∼⊕4 |∼lcd
P Z penalty lex Brewka Geffner
KLM rationality postulates
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
No irrelevance
√ √ √ √ √ √
No inheritance block
√ √ √ √ √
Preserve ambiguity
√ √ √
Independent of # repetitions
√ √ √ √ √
Independent of # supports




Properties underlying the systems analyzed in this paper
Existing systems Main principle εbf systems Main principle
P ε-probabilities |∼bf ε-belief and auto-deduction
Z tolerance |∼lc +ε-least commitment on ∆
– – |∼⊕ +ε-least commitment on d ∈∆ and
Dempster ⊕ and . . .
penalty paying for unsatisfied defaults |∼⊕1 εd = δi for d ∈∆i , δ ∈ E0
lexicographic equal weight within same strata |∼⊕2
∏i−1
j=1 δj |∆j |>∞ δi , for i = 2, . . . , n+ 1




h=1 εjh >∞ εis for all
s = 1, . . . , |∆i |,
Geffner conditional entailment |∼⊕4
∏
d′ : εd ′>∞εd εd′ >∞ εd for all d ∈∆,
– – |∼lcd least-committed ε-stratification
Table 3 summarizes the essential properties that underlie the systems analyzed in this
paper. On the left we list the existing systems, and on the right the equivalent system based
on εbf’s. The |∼lcd system is a special case of the |∼⊕ family. We start with the concept of
a default base issued by a single source, and apply the auto-deduction principle, in which
case we get a system equivalent to P . We then add the concept of ε-least commitment
applied on ∆, and we get a system equivalent to Z. We proceed then by assuming instead
that each rule in ∆ is issued by a different (distinct) source of information, apply the ε-
least-commitment principle to each d ∈∆, and combine the individual belief functions by
Dempster’s rule of combination. Further explicit constraints on the infinitesimals lead to
systems equivalent to the penalty system, to the lexicographic system, to Brewka system
and to Geffner system. If these explicit constraints are replaced by the application of the
least commitment principle to some ε-stratification of the infinitesimals, we obtain the
LCD system.
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It is important to notice that, in our use of the theory of belief functions, we have
actually employed only two mechanisms which are peculiar to this theory: the least-
commitment principle, as a way to select minimally informative models; and Dempster’s
rule of combination, as a way to aggregate (default) information. Interestingly, we have
not used numerical values. This gives our treatment a qualitative flavor, and frees us from
the delicate problem of having to justify the origin of the numbers that would otherwise be
attached to default rules.
Finally, we note that the approach presented in this paper is purely semantic: we have
defined non-monotonic consequence in terms of satisfaction in a certain class of models.
It would be interesting to derive a syntactic characterization of the different εbf-based
consequence relations. Also, we should like to find effective algorithms to compute these
relations. This is especially true of LCD. These tasks are left for future work.
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Appendix A. Properties of infinitesimals
We present the formal proofs of those properties of infinitesimals used in this paper
and defined in Section 2.4. By Definition 2, infinitesimals are defined such that their
domain is (0,1), their limit for η → 0 is 0, and their order is always a well-defined
non-negative integer. The set E0 is the set of infinitesimals, E1 = {1 − ε | ε ∈ E0} and
E= E0 ∪E1 ∪ {0} ∪ {1}.
Definition A1. For any continuous function f :R→ R whose order κ(f ) is defined, the
limit limη→0 f (η)/ηk(f ) is denoted λ(f ), the term λ(f ) ·ηκ(f ) is called the dominant term
of f and λ(f ) is called the coefficient of the dominant term. λ(0)= 0 and κ(0)=∞ by
convention.
Lemma A.1. For ε ∈ E0 ∪ {0}, κ(1− ε)= 0 and λ(1− ε)= 1.
Proof. We have limη→0(1− ε(n))/η0 = 1 for ε ∈ E0 ∪ {0}. 2
Lemma A.2. Let t, t ′ ∈ E.
(a) κ(t + t ′)=min(κ(t), κ(t ′)) and if t + t ′ 6 1, t + t ′ ∈ E.
(b) κ(max(t, t ′))=min(κ(t), κ(t ′)) and max(t, t ′) ∈ E.
(c) κ(t · t ′)= κ(t)+ κ(t ′) and t · t ′ ∈ E.
(d) If κ(t) < κ(t ′), then κ(t − t ′)= κ(t) and if t − t ′ > 0, t − t ′ ∈ E.
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Proof. The second half of each assertion is valid by noticing that (1) sums, maximum,
products and differences preserve continuity, and (2) the ranges and the limit conditions
are satisfied for maximum and products and for differences and additions, thanks to the
extra requirements. As both t and t ′ belong to E, their orders are well defined. Therefore
the orders are also well defined for their sum, max, product and difference. The first half











The value of σ equals 0 if k < min(κ(t), κ(t ′)), λ(t) if k = κ(t) < κ(t ′), λ(t ′) if k =
κ(t ′) < κ(t), and λ(t)+λ(t ′) if k = κ(t)= κ(t ′), and is infinite when k >min(κ(t), κ(t ′)).
The order of σ is defined iff σ ∈ R − {0}. This is achieved iff k = min(κ(t), κ(t ′)). As














One has σ ∈ R − {0} iff k = min(κ(t), κ(t ′)). Would k be smaller, both term would
have a zero limit, and would it be larger, at least one term would be infinite. As σ =




t · t ′
ηk
∗+k∗∗ .
















and both limits are well defined. Then σ ∈R− {0} and thus κ(t · t ′)= κ(t)+ κ(t ′).











The second term tends to 0, hence σ /∈ R− {0}. By symmetry, the same holds if κ(t ′) =
min(κ(t), κ(t ′)).
Suppose k∗ + k∗∗ <min(κ(t), κ(t ′)), then both terms tend to 0, hence σ /∈R− {0}.
Suppose k∗ + k∗∗ > κ(t)+ κ(t ′), then we can rewrite σ as
σ = lim
η→0
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With κ(t) < κ(t ′), then σ ∈ R − {0} iff k = κ(t). As σ = limη→0(t − t ′)/ηk , then
κ(t − t ′)= κ(t). 2
The next lemma shows that the dominant terms contain the information needed to
determine the limit of the ratio of two infinitesimals.








































We show that the definitions of >∞, >∞ and ≈∞ can equivalently be expressed by
inequalities between orders.
Lemma A.4. Let t, t ′ ∈ E. Then:
(a) t >∞ t ′ iff κ(t)6 κ(t ′),
(b) t >∞ t ′ iff κ(t) < κ(t ′) iff limη→0 t ′/t = 0,
(c) t ≈∞ t ′ iff κ(t)= κ(t ′).











where λ(t) 6= 0 and λ(t ′) 6= 0.
(a) By definition, t >∞ t ′ iff limη→0 t ′/t ∈ [0,∞), which is achieved iff κ(t)6 κ(t ′).
(b) From (a), t >∞ t ′ means κ(t) 6 κ(t ′) and not κ(t ′) 6 κ(t), hence κ(t) < κ(t ′).
Furthermore, limη→0 ηκ(t
′)−κ(t) = 0 in that case.
(c) t ≈∞ t ′ means thus κ(t)6 κ(t ′) and κ(t ′)6 κ(t), hence κ(t)= κ(t ′). 2
The >∞ relation is extended to R+, the set of positive reals. For α,β ∈ R+ ∪ E, we
write α >∞ β to mean limη→0 β/α ∈ [0,∞), and similarly for α >∞ β and α ≈∞ β .
Lemma A.5. Let α ∈R+ and t ∈ E.
(a) κ(α)= 0 and λ(α)= α.
(b) If αt < 1, κ(αt)= κ(t) and λ(αt)= αλ(t).
(c) α >∞ t .
Proof. (a) limη→0 α/η0 = α.
(b) limη→0 αt(η)/ηk = α limη→0 t (η)/ηk , so κ(αt)= κ(t) and λ(αt)= αλ(t).
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(c) One has κ(t) > 0, and by Lemma A.5(a), κ(α) = 0. So κ(α) 6 κ(t) and by
Lemma A.4(a), α >∞ t . 2
In the next lemmas, most proofs are trivial thanks to the relation between >∞ and the
inequalities on the orders.
Lemma A.6. The >∞ relation is a pre-order, i.e., it is reflexive and transitive.
Proof. As t >∞ t ′ iff κ(t) 6 κ(t ′), and 6 is a pre-order on the integers, then >∞ is a
pre-order. 2
Remark A.1. The expected properties of the induced relations >∞ and ≈∞ follow from
the properties of >∞. For example, transitivity of ≈∞ follows from transitivity of >∞.
Properties involving different operators also follow easily. E.g., if t ≈∞ t ′ and t ′ >∞ t ′′,
then t >∞ t ′′.
Lemma A.7. Let s ∈ E0, t ∈ E1, and r ∈R+. Then
(a) s >∞ 0 and t >∞ 0;
(b) r >∞ s and r ≈∞ t ;
(c) t >∞ s.
Proof. We have κ(s) ∈ (0,∞), κ(t)= 0, κ(r)= 0 and κ(0)=∞.
(a) κ(s) < κ(0) and κ(t) < κ(0).
(b) κ(r) < κ(s) and κ(r)= κ(t).
(c) κ(t) < κ(s). 2
Remark A.2. These properties show that the elements of E0 and E1 correctly capture
the intended meaning of values infinitesimally close to 0 and to 1, respectively. Note that
r ≈∞ t entails that all real numbers are of the same order (no real number is infinitesimally
larger than any other real number), and of the same order as the terms in E1.
Lemma A.8. Let s, t ∈ E. Then
(a) s >∞ t iff s + t ≈∞ s, provided s + t ∈ E;
(b) s >∞ t iff s + t >∞ t ;
(c) if s ∈ E0, then t >∞ s · t , provided that t 6= 0;
(d) if s ∈ E1, then t ≈∞ s · t ;
(e) for any r ∈R+, t ≈∞ r · t , provided r · t ∈ E.
Proof.
(a) As κ(s)6 κ(t), and κ(s+ t)=min(κ(s), κ(t)) by Lemma A.2, thus κ(s+ t)= κ(s).
(b) κ(s) < κ(t), and κ(s + t)=min(κ(s), κ(t))= κ(s), so κ(s + t) < κ(t).
(c) κ(s) ∈ (0,∞), κ(t) < κ(s · t)= κ(s)+ κ(t) provided κ(t) 6= ∞, which is the case
as t 6= 0.
(d) κ(s)= 0, κ(s · t)= κ(s)+ κ(t)= κ(t).
(e) κ(r)= 0, κ(r · t)= κ(r)+ κ(t)= κ(t). 2
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Remark A.3. The above properties show that >∞ captures the desired behavior of a
negligibility relation. More specifically, (a) and (b) show that the sum of elements of E is
of the same order as the larger argument of the sum. (c), (d) and (e) show that the product
of an element t of E1 with elements of E1 or real numbers is of the same order as t ; and
with an element of E0 is of a smaller order. Note that (c) gives t >∞ t · t for all t ∈ E0 as a
special case.
Note that if we do not know anything about the relation between t and t ′, we can
neither say much about t + t ′. For example, from t >∞ s and t ′ >∞ s′ we cannot infer
t + t ′ >∞ s + s′. (Take κ(t ′) < κ(t), κ(s′) < κ(s) and κ(t ′) = κ(s′), then κ(t + t ′) =
min(κ(t), κ(t ′))= κ(t ′)= κ(s′)=min(κ(s), κ(s′))= κ(s + s′), hence t + t ′ ≈∞ s + s′.)
However, from t >∞ s and t ′ >∞ s′ we always have t + t ′ >∞ s + s′.
Lemma A.9. Let s, s′, t, t ′ ∈ E. Then
(a) if s ≈∞ s′ and t ≈∞ t ′, then s >∞ t iff s′ >∞ t ′;
(b) if s ≈∞ s′ and t ≈∞ t ′, then s >∞ t iff s′ >∞ t ′;
(c) if s >∞ s′ and t >∞ t ′, then s + t >∞ s′ + t ′;
(d) if s >∞ s′ and t >∞ t ′, then s · t >∞ s′ · t ′;
(e) if s = t , then s ≈∞ t ;
(f) if s ≈∞ s′ and s′ >∞ t , then s >∞ t .
Proof. All properties are proved by a direct comparison of their orders. 2
Remark A.4. The above properties tell us that we can substitute equivalent (≈∞) terms
inside >∞, >∞ and ≈∞ relations; note that (c) and (d) yield s + t ≈∞ s′ + t ′ and
s · t ≈∞ s′ · t ′ whenever s ≈∞ s′ and t ≈∞ t ′. (e) tells us that we can also substitute equal
terms.
Lemma A.10. Let t, t ′ ∈ E ∪ R+. If κ(t) and κ(t ′) are defined, then κ(t + t ′) =
min(κ(t), κ(t ′)).
Proof. The proof is the same as the one for Lemma A.2(a) relative to κ(t+ t ′). Indeed that
t and t ′ belong to E∪R+ was not used. The only requirement was that both κ(t) and κ(t ′)
were defined. 2
Lemma A.11. Let t1, . . . , tn ∈ E. Then maxi=1,...,n ti ≈∞∑ni=1 ti .
Proof. Let ki = κ(ti) for i = 1, . . . , n. By applying Lemmas A.10 and A.2(b) recursively,
we have κ(
∑n
i=1 ti )=min(ki : i = 1, . . . , n) and κ(max(ti : i = 1, . . . , n))=min(ki: i =
1, . . . , n). Hence the theorem is proved by Lemma A.4(c). 2
Lemma A.12. Let t1, . . . , tn ∈ E, and let tj be such tj >∞ ti for all i 6= j . Then,
maxi=1,...,n ti ≈∞ tj .
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Proof. The inequalities tj >∞ ti for all i 6= j mean that κ(tj ) 6 κ(ti) for all i 6= j . So
κ(tj )=mini=1,...,n κ(ti). By Lemma A.2(b), κ(maxi=1,...,n ti)=mini=1,...,n ki . Hence the
theorem is proved by Lemma A.4(c). 2
Lemma A.13. Let ε1, ε2, ε3, ε4 ∈ E0. Then:
(a) max(ε1, ε2) >∞ ε3 iff ε1 >∞ ε3 or ε2 >∞ ε3;
(b) if ε1 >∞ ε2, ε3 >∞ ε4, then max(ε1, ε3) >∞ max(ε2, ε4).
Proof. (a) By Lemma A.4(b), max(ε1, ε2) >∞ ε3 iff κ(max(ε1, ε2)) < κ(ε3). By Lem-
ma A.2(b), κ(max(ε1, ε2)) = min(κ(ε1), κ(ε2)). So min(κ(ε1), κ(ε2)) < κ(ε3), hence
either κ(ε1) < κ(ε3) or κ(ε2) < κ(ε3), in which case either ε1 >∞ ε3 or ε2 >∞ ε3 holds
by Lemma A.4(b).
(b) By Lemma A.4(b), ε1 >∞ ε2 iff κ(ε1) < κ(ε2), and ε3 >∞ ε4 iff κ(ε3) < κ(ε4).
Hence max(κ(ε1), κ(ε3)) < max(κ(ε2), κ(ε4)), which implies by Lemma A.4(b) that
max(ε1, ε3) >∞ max(ε2, ε4). 2
Appendix B. Proofs of technical lemmas
Lemma 1. Let mE be an ε-mass assignment. Then mE (A) ∈ E1 ∪ {1} for exactly one
element A⊆Ω , and mE (X) ∈ E0 ∪ {0} for all X 6=A.
Proof. Let A1, . . . ,Ak be the subsets of Ω, k = 2|Ω|, and let ti denote mE (Ai), i = 1,
. . . , k, where ti ∈ E. Suppose ti ∈ E0 ∪ {0} for all i . By definition of infinitesimal, for each
ti we can find an ηi ∈ (0,1) such that ti(η) < 1/k for any η 6 ηi . Let η∗ be the minimum
of these ηi . Then,
∑k
i=1 ti(η∗) < 1. But mE is an ε-mass assignment, and so we must
have
∑k
i=1 ti(η)= 1 for all η ∈ (0,1). We have a contradiction: thus there must be at least
one ti that is not in E0 ∪ {0}, that is, ti ∈ E1 ∪ {1}. We now prove that this element is
unique. For suppose that it is not, and that there is Aj 6= Ai such that both ti and tj are in
E1 ∪ {1}. This means that both limη→0 ti = 1 and limη→0 tj = 1. Then, there are ηi and ηj
in (0,1) such that ti (η) > 12 for all η 6 ηi , and that tj (η) >
1
2 for all η 6 ηj . But then, if
we let η∗ = min(ηi, ηj ), we have ∑ki=1 ti(η∗) > ti(η∗)+ tj (η∗) > 1, again contradicting
the hypothesis that mE is an ε-mass assignment. 2
Lemma 2. Let E be a finite set of infinitesimals, and let m1 and m2 be two ε-mass
assignments on Ω . Then m12 = m1 ⊕ m2 is an ε-mass assignment, provided that the
normalization factor in the combination is 1.
Proof. First note that, by definition of ⊕, the normalization factor k is 1 only if the
intersection of any focal element of m1 with any focal element of m2 is non-empty. Let
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where each non-nullm1(B) and m2(C) is either 1, ε or (1− ε) with ε ∈ E0. Then,m12(A)
is the sum of products of terms in E, and this sum belongs to E if m12(A) 6 1 (Lem-
ma A.2(a)).
Let t ′(η) = m12(A). We need to verify that t ′(η) ∈ [0,1] for any η ∈ (0,1). Fix
an η ∈ (0,1), and let m1|η and m2|η denote the (standard) basic belief assignments
obtained for this η. Let m12|η = m1|η ⊕ m2|η. Then, m12|η is a basic belief assignment
[47, Theorem 3.1]. This implies that m12|η(A) ∈ [0,1]; as this is true for all η, then
t ′(η) = m12(A) ∈ E. Moreover, this implies that, for each η, the sum of all the masses
is 1. Therefore,m12 is an ε-mass assignment as per Definition 3. 2




(b) plE (X)≈∞ max{plE (x) | x ∈X}.










kY ·mE (Y ),
where kY = |Y ∩X|, for Y ⊆Ω , is the number of times that the term mE (Y ) appears in the
summation in the middle term. As mE (Y ) ∈ E for all Y ⊆Ω , then, kY ·mE (Y )≈∞ mE (Y )
by Lemma A.8(e). By repeatedly applying Lemma A.9(c),∑
Y∩X 6=∅




But the right hand side is exactly the expression of plE (X), and the thesis thus follows from
Lemma A.9(e) and the transitivity of ≈∞.
(b) The case when plE (X) = 0 is trivial, as plE (X) = 0 if and only if plE (x) = 0 for
all x ∈ X (this is an immediate consequence of the definition of pl), and 0 ≈∞ 0 by
stipulation. So we assume that plE (X) 6= 0. But this means that there is some x ∈X such
that plE (x) 6= 0, so we can apply Lemma A.11, and the thesis follows immediately from
part (a) above. 2
Lemma 4. Let belE be an εbf, and let α→ β be a default rule.
(i) belE |= α→ β iff maxω|=α∧β plE (ω) >∞ maxω|=α∧¬β plE (ω).
(ii) belE |= α→ β iff limη→0 belE (β|α)= 1.
Proof. (i) The equivalence follows immediately from Definition 4, Lemmas 3(b)
and A.9(b).
(ii) Assume first that εbf is an εbf-model of α→ β . By definition,




By monotonicity of plausibility, plE (α)> plE (α ∧ β), and then
plE (α ∧¬β)
plE (α)
6 plE (α ∧¬β)
plE (α ∧ β)
.
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Let s(η) denote the last term. The above inequality tells us that belE (β|α)> 1− s. (Recall
that the > is taken pointwise for any η ∈ (0,1).) The hypothesis that belE is an εbf-model




plE (α ∧ β)
= lim
η→0 s(η)= 0.
Then, from belE (β|α)> 1− s and belE (β|α)6 1 (by definition), we get limη→0 belE (β|α)
= 1 as desired.
To prove the reverse implication, assume limη→0 belE (β|α)= 1. Then, by applying the














which means plE (α) >∞ plE (α∧¬β). Lemma 2(a) tells us that plE (α)≈∞ plE (α∧¬β)+
plE (α ∧ β) (we just consider a coarsening of Ω consisting of the two elements [α ∧ ¬β]
and [α ∧ β]), and so, by Lemma A.9(b),
plE (α ∧¬β)+ plE (α ∧ β) >∞ plE (α ∧¬β).
Finally, we apply Lemma A.8(b) to get plE (α ∧ β) >∞ plE (α ∧¬β), which concludes the
proof. 2
Lemma 5. Let belE be an εbf on Ω . For any α, β formulae of L, belE |= α→ β if, and
only if, each bel-preferred world of α satisfies β.
Proof. For the length of the proof, we denote by [α]E the set of belE -preferred worlds
of α. To prove the if part, assume that for each belE -preferred world ω of α we have
ω |= β. First, we show that [α]E = [α ∧ β]E . To see that [α]E ⊆ [α ∧ β]E , suppose there is
an ω which is a belE -preferred model of α but not of α∧β , then, there should exist a world
ω′ which satisfies α ∧ β (and therefore α) such that ω′ ≺E ω, but this contradicts the fact
that ω is a belE -preferred world of α. To see that [α]E ⊇ [α∧β]E , let ω be a belE -preferred
world of α ∧ β but not of α, then, there should exist a belE -preferred world ω′ of α such
that ω′ ≺E ω. Since ω′ |= β , then ω′ also satisfies α∧β , but this contradicts the fact that ω
is a belE -preferred world of α ∧ β . Hence, we must have [α]E = [α ∧ β]E . Now, for each
belE -preferred world ω of [α ∧¬β]E there is an ω′ ∈ [α ∧ β]E such that ω′ ≺E ω. (If not,
then ω′ would be a bel-preferred world of α, contradicting the fact that [α]E = [α ∧ β]E .)
But then, by definition of ≺E , we have plE (α ∧ β) >∞ plE (α ∧ ¬β), which means that
belE |= α→ β , thus concluding the proof of the if side.
To prove now the only if part, it is enough to show that if plE (α ∧ β) >∞ plE (α ∧¬β)
then [α]E = [α ∧ β]E , for all the worlds in [α]E satisfy β . Suppose, by way of refutation,
that [α]E 6= [α ∧ β]E . Then, there exists a world ω that satisfies α ∧ ¬β and which is a
belE -preferred world of α. This means that there is no world ω′ that satisfies α ∧ β such
that ω′ ≺E ω. But then plE (α ∧ β) is not preferred to plE (α ∧¬β), which contradicts our
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hypothesis. So, we must have [α]E = [α ∧ β]E , and hence each belE -preferred world of α
satisfies β , thus concluding the proof. 2
Theorem 1. For a given ∆, α |∼bf β if, and only if, α |∼P β .
Proof. For the only if part, note that infinitesimal probability distributions PE are a special
case of εbf’s where only singletons are assigned non-zero masses. Thus, EBF(∆) includes
all the infinitesimal probability distributions PE compatible with ∆, and we have α |∼bf β
only if, for all such distributions, PE |= α → β . By Lemma 4, the latter condition is
equivalent to limη→0 PE (β|α)= 1, which is the definition of Adams’ ε-consequence. So,
we have α |∼bf β only if α |∼ε β , and the thesis follows by recalling the equivalence between
|∼ε and |∼P [35, Lemmas 4.7 and 4.9].
To prove the if part, we show that each inference relation induced by any belE in
EBF(∆) is preferential. Take any belE , and consider W = (Ω, Id,≺E ), where Id is the
identity function and≺E is the belE -preference relation. Clearly,W is a preferential model.
Moreover, by Lemma 5
W |= α→ β iff belE |= α→ β,
that is, W represents the inference relation induced by belE . By the representation theorem
of Kraus et al. [31, Theorem 5.18], this means that this inference relation is preferential,
and therefore it satisfies all the rules of P . As this is true for any belE in EBF(∆), then |∼bf
also satisfies the rules of P , and so it contains all the preferential consequences of ∆. 2
The first part can also be proved by showing the transformation between the so-called
uniform sequence of probability functions by Adams [1] and infinitesimal probabilities.
Lemma 6. Consider a set {A1, . . . ,An} of n nested subsets of Ω , with A1 ⊆ A2 ⊆ · · · ⊆
An, A1 6= ∅, An =Ω . Let C = {C1, . . . ,Cn} be a set of constraints Ci given by:
C1: pl(A1)= 1>∞ pl(A¯1), and











Proof. For the proof, we take the family ΛC of εbf’s, we show that its element satisfy the
constraints C, that any εbf that satisfies the constraints C will either belong to ΛC or will
dominate one of the εbf’s in ΛC , and that none of the εbf’s in ΛC dominates another εbf
in ΛC .
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Let bel∗ ∈ ΛC . By construction, its related plausibility function pl∗ satisfies, for all
X⊆Ω,




εi if X ∩Aj 6= ∅ and X ∩Aj−1 = ∅.
These relations are those required by the constraints Ci .
Next we show that any other εbf that satisfies the constraints C will dominate one of the
εbf’s in ΛC . Consider an εbf bel that satisfies C, and let pl and m be its related plausibility
function and basic belief assignment. We show first that if A1 is not the only focal element
of bel with non-infinitesimal mass, then pl dominates the elements ofΛC . Let B be a focal
element of bel with m(B) /∈ E0. If A 6⊆ B, B ∩A1 6= ∅, then pl(A1 ∩ SB)6 1−m(B) < 1
and bel cannot be εLC than bel∗ as pl∗(A1 ∩ SB) = 1 > pl(A ∩ SB). If B ∩ A¯1 6= ∅, then
pl(A¯1)>m(B) > 0, and we do not have pl(A1) >∞ pl(A¯1), contrary to C1. So onlyA1 can
be a focal element with a non-infinitesimal basic belief mass, and for all X ⊆Ω, X 6= A1,
m(X) ∈ E0 ∪ {0}. In that case, limη→0 pl(X)= limη→0 pl∗(X) for all X ⊆Ω , so we focus
on the second requirement of the definition of εLC.
Let the sets A1 = {X: X ⊆ A1}, and Ai = {X: X 6⊆ Ai−1,X ⊆ Ai}, i = 2,3, . . . , n.
For i = 1,2, . . . , n, let m0(Ai)=∑{m(X): X ∈Ai}. By construction m0 is εLC than m.
As already shown, it satisfies C1, and m0(Ai) ∈ E0 ∪ {0} for i = 2,3, . . . , n. To satisfy
Ci,m0 must satisfy: m0(Ai) 6= 0 and m0(Ai) >∞ m0(Ai+1), i = 2,3, . . . , n− 1, in which
case m0 ∈ΛC . If m0(Ai)= 0 for some i ∈ {2,3, . . . , n}, then m(X)= 0 for all X ∈Ai , in
which case pl(A¯i−1 ∩Ai) < pl(A¯i), hence it does not satisfy Ci .
Finally, only those elements of ΛC could be non-dominating εbf’s that satisfy C. None
of them is εLC than any other inΛC as they share the same focal elementsAi , so none can
be a {0,1}-generalization of the other. So none of them can be taken out of ΛC . 2
Lemma 7. Let ∆ be a default base. Then:
(a) Any element of Bellc(∆) is an εbf-model of ∆.
(b) Let bel1 and bel2 be two elements of Bellc(∆), and ≺1 and ≺2 the corresponding
orderings induced on Ω . Then, ≺1≡≺2.
Proof. (a) At each step i , we add a new focal element, and give it a mass εi−1−εi taken off
from Ω . As εi >∞ εi+1, the new beli still satisfies all the defaults in ∆ that were satisfied
by beli−1. In particular, the εbf returned at Step 2 satisfies all of ∆.
(b) All the elements of Bellc(∆) are consonant belief functions with the same focal
elements. Let ω be a world, and let εi−1−εi be the mass given to the smallest focal element
that contains ω. Given Lemma 3, plE (ω) is of order εi−1 for each belE in Bellc(∆). As the
ordering ≺ only depends on the relative order of magnitude of the involved plausibilities,
≺ is the same no matter which belE in Bellc(∆) we consider. 2
Lemma 8. Let {∆1,∆2, . . . ,∆k} be the stratification given by system Z, and let beli the
εbf built by the LC algorithm at step i . Then, for any default α→ β in ∆,
(a) α→ β is tolerated by ∆ iff pl1(α)= 1;
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(b) α→ β is not tolerated by ∆i ∪ · · · ∪∆k iff pli (α ∧ β)= pli (α ∧¬β)= εi ;
(c) α→ β ∈∆i implies beli |= α→ β ;
(d) beli |= α→ β and pli−1(α ∧ β) = pli−1(α ∧ ¬β) = εi−1 (i.e., beli−1 6|= α→ β)
implies that α→ β ∈∆i .
Proof. (a) We first notice that the rule α → β ∈ ∆ is tolerated by ∆ iff α ∧ φ∆ is
consistent [6]. Recall that m1(Ω)= ε1 and m1(φ∆)= 1− ε1; then, by definition of pl, we
have pl1(X)= 1 if X ∩ [φ∆] 6= ∅, and pl1(X)= ε1 otherwise. So, in particular, pl1(α)= 1
iff [α] ∩ [φ∆] 6= ∅, i.e., iff α ∧ φ∆ is consistent, hence iff α→ β is tolerated by ∆.
(b) Notice that α→ β is not tolerated by ∆i ∪ · · · ∪∆k iff α (hence α ∧ β and α ∧¬β)
is inconsistent with any superset of ∆i ∪ · · · ∪∆k iff pli (α ∧ β)= pli (α ∧¬β)= εi .
(c) For i = 1, the proposition holds by (a). For i > 1, α→ β ∈∆i means that α ∧ β is
consistent with ∆i ∪ · · · ∪∆k , and that α (hence α ∧ β and α ∧ ¬β) is inconsistent with
any superset of∆i ∪ · · ·∪∆k . Thus, pli (α∧β)= εi−1 and pli (α∧¬β)= εi , which means
that beli |= α→ β .
(d) By (b) pli−1(α ∧ β) = pli−1(α ∧ ¬β) = εi−1 means that α→ β is not tolerated
by ∆i−1 ∪ · · · ∪∆k , hence is not tolerated by any superset of ∆i−1 ∪ · · · ∪∆k , therefore
α→ β /∈∆j with j < i . Now beli |= α→ β implies that pli (α ∧ β) >∞ pli (α ∧¬β) then
by (b) α→ β is tolerated by ∆i ∪ · · · ∪∆k hence α→ β ∈∆i . 2
Lemma 9. For every d ∈∆, let md be the simple support function so that:
md(Ω)= εd; md(φd)= 1− εd; and md(X)= 0 otherwise, with εd ∈ E0
and let m⊕ =⊕{md | d ∈∆}. Then, for any world ω in Ω ,
pl⊕(ω)≈∞
∏
{εd | d ∈∆ s.t. ω 6|= φd},
and pl⊕(ω)≈∞ 1 if ω satisfies all the defaults in ∆.





where each F is a focal element of m⊕. Let’s analyze these focal elements. By
construction, each F is the intersection of the focal elements of some of the md ’s, i.e.,













With κ denoting the order (see Definition A.1), we have:









by Lemmas 3 and A.2(b),
= min









κ(εd) by Lemma A.2(c).
As each κ(εd) is positive and finite, the minimum is achieved when ∆′ is the ‘largest’
possible subbase of ∆, hence when ∆′ = ∆ω = {d: ω |= φd, d ∈ ∆}, any other ∆′′ that
satisfies ω |= φ∆′′ being a subset of ∆ω, in which case the sum would be larger.
We distinguish two cases.
(i) ∆ω = ∆, that is, ω satisfies all the defaults in ∆. (Note that [φ∆] is the only focal
element for which this may be the case.) Then, the second product in (§) is empty,
and so m⊕(Fω)≈∞ 1, as stated in our thesis.













{εd | d ∈∆ s.t. ω 6|= φd}
)
. 2
Lemma 10. Let ω and ω′ be elements of Ω , and let belE be any element of Bel⊕1(∆).
Then, ω is penalty-preferred to ω′ if and only if ω is belE -preferred to ω′.
Proof. We first recall the definition of preference used in penalty logic. Let {∆1, . . . ,∆n}
be a stratification of ∆. Each default (or, more generally, piece of information) d in ∆i is
associated with the penalty c(d) = i , read as the price to pay if d is not satisfied. These
penalties induce a complete order on the elements of Ω based on the cost
C(ω)=
∑{




where ki(ω) is the number of defaults of ∆i which are not satisfied by the world ω and
n= |∆|. We say that ω is penalty-preferred to ω′ iff C(ω) < C(ω′). For a given formula
α, we say that an interpretation ω is α-penalty-preferred if it satisfies α and there is no
interpretation ω′ satisfying α such that C(ω′) < C(ω). Finally, β is a penalty-consequence
of α and∆ iff each α-penalty-preferred interpretation satisfies β. Turning now attention to
our system, we have εd = δi for d ∈∆i . It is easy to see that, for each world ω,
plE (ω)≈∞
∏
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Then, we have plE (ω) ≈∞ δC(ω). Hence plE (ω) >∞ plE (ω′) iff C(ω) < C(ω′) iff ω is
penalty-preferred to ω′, hence the thesis. 2
Lemma 11. Let ω and ω′ be elements of Ω , and let belE be any element of Bel⊕2(∆).
Then, ω is lex-preferred to ω′ if and only if ω is belE -preferred to ω′.
Proof. We start by recalling the definition of lex-preference (see [4] for more details).
Let ∆ be the given base, and {∆1, . . . ,∆n} be the given stratification for it. Then, an
interpretation ω is said to be lex-preferred to ω′ if and only if there exist an index 16 i 6 n
such that:
(1) |[ω]i|> |[ω′]i |, and
(2) if i < n,∀n> j > i, |[ω]j | = |[ω′]j |,
where |[ω]i| is the number of rules in ∆i satisfied by ω. A non-monotonic consequence
relation, called a lexicographical entailment and denoted by |∼lex, is defined from this




{εd | d ∈∆ s.t. ω 6|= φd},
and by our stipulations∏






where f (ω, k) is the number of defaults in ∆k that are falsified by ω.
(⇒) Assume that ω is lex-preferred to ω′, and let i be such that ∀j > i, |[ω]j | = |[ω′]j |,
























f (ω′,j) (since f (ω′, j)= f (ω, j)). (∗)









f (ω,k) >∞ δi (since f (ω, k)6 |∆k| and δ ∈ (0,1))





f (ω,k) >∞ δif (ω
′,i)−f (ω,i) (where f (ω′, i)− f (ω, i) is positive),
both⇒ result from Lemma A.8(c) and the transitivity of >∞. Hence, (∗) becomes:
plE (ω) >∞ δif (ω




















⇒ plE (ω) >∞ plE (ω′)
and thence the thesis.
(⇐) The reverse implication can be shown to hold in a similar way. Assume that
plE (ω) >∞ plE (ω′) and suppose, by way of contradiction, that ω is not lex-preferred to
ω′. We distinguish two cases:
(1) ω′ is neither lex-preferred to ω, and hence ω and ω′ falsify exactly the same number
of rules in each ∆i ; but this means that plE (ω) = plE (ω′), which contradicts our
hypothesis; or
(2) ω′ is lex-preferred to ω; but then, using the if part of the proof, plE (ω′) >∞ plE (ω),
which again contradicts the hypothesis.
Hence, ω must be lex-preferred to ω′, and our proof is concluded. 2
Lemma 12. Let ω and ω′ be elements of Ω . Then, ω is B-preferred to ω′ if and only if ω
is belE -preferred to ω′ in each belE of Bel⊕3(∆).
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 11. We again start by recalling the preference
ordering used in Brewka’s system. Let ∆ be a stratified base as above. An interpretation ω
is said to be B-preferred to ω′ (with respect to ∆) if and only if there exists a layer index i
such that:
(1) if i < n, [ω′]i ⊂ [ω]i , and
(2) ∀n> j > i, [ω]j = [ω′]j ,
where [ω]i denotes the set of defaults of ∆i satisfied by ω.
(⇒) The proof goes as the corresponding one in Lemma 11. By our stipulations:
plE (ω)≈∞
∏







where ∆(ω,k) is the set of defaults in ∆k that are falsified by ω. Now, assume that ω
is B-preferred to ω′, and let i be such that ∀j > i, [ω]j = [ω′]j , and [ω]i ⊃ [ω′]i (i.e.,
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(where dij ∈∆(ω′, i)−∆(ω, i) which is not empty)





















(since ∏dji∈∆(ω′,i)−∆(ω,i) εji ·∏dji∈∆(ω,i) εji =∏dji∈∆(ω′,i) εji ,
and recall that ∆(ω,k)⊂∆(ω′, k))














⇒ plE (ω) >∞ plE (ω′)
and thence the thesis.
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(⇐) To see that the “only if” part holds, assume that plE (ω) >∞ plE (ω′) holds for each
belE of Bel⊕3(∆) and suppose, by way of contradiction, that ω is not B-preferred to ω′.
We distinguish two cases:
(1) ω′ is B-preferred to ω, then, by the if part of the proof, plE (ω′) >∞ plE (ω), for each
belE of Bel⊕3(∆) which contradicts our hypothesis, or
(2) ω′ is not B-preferred to ω′, then, either
(a) for any j, [ω]j = [ω′]j , but this means that plE (ω′)= plE (ω) since they exactly
falsify the same set of defaults, which contradicts our hypothesis, or
(b) there exists an index i such that, ∀j > i, [ω]j = [ω′]j and neither [ω]i ⊃ [ω′]i
nor [ω′]i ⊃ [ω]i .
In case (2b), we can easily construct a belE which belongs to Bel⊕3(∆) and such that
plE (ω′) >∞ plE (ω) (and hence contradicts the hypothesis). belE should satisfy the two















εji >∞ εsi for all dsi /∈∆(ω′, i).
These constraints are obtained by simply assuming a refinement of the stratification of ∆
where each ∆i is in fact split in two parts where defaults falsified by ω′ are less prioritary
than those satisfied by ω′. Clearly, condition (i) guarantees that belE belongs to Bel⊕3(∆),






















































Now from the above condition (ii), we have:

















εji >∞ εsi for all dsi ∈∆(ω, i)−∆(ω′, i)









εji >∞ εsi for all dsi ∈∆(ω, i)−∆(ω′, i)









εji >∞ εsi for all dsi ∈∆(ω, i)−∆(ω′, i)













(using the property A.8(c)).




































⇒ plE (ω′) >∞ plE (ω)
and hence the thesis. 2
Theorem 2. Let |∼B be the inference relation of Brewka’s preferred subtheories system.
Then, for any given ∆,α |∼B β if, and only if, α |∼⊕3 β .
Proof. (⇒)
α |∼B β
⇔∀ω ∈ [α ∧¬β],∃ω′ ∈ [α ∧ β] such that ω′ is B-preferred to ω
⇒∀ω ∈ [α ∧¬β],∃ω′ ∈ [α ∧¬β] such that plE (ω′) >∞ plE (ω)
in each belE of Bel⊕3(∆) (due to Lemma 12)
⇒ α |∼⊕3 β.
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(⇐) Assume that α |∼⊕3 β holds but α |∼B β does not hold, this means that ∃ω′ ∈
[α∧¬β] such that ∀ω ∈ [α∧β],ω is not B-preferred to ω′. Again, we can easily construct
a belE of Bel⊕3(∆) such that plE (ω′) =∞ plE (ω) holds for any ω ∈ [α ∧ β] (and hence
contradicts the hypothesis). Indeed, let ω ∈ [α ∧ β], we proceeds as in Lemma 12 by
distinguishing two cases:
(1) ω′ is B-preferred to ω, then, by the if part of the proof of Lemma 12, plE (ω′) >∞
plE (ω), or
(2) ω′ is not B-preferred to ω′, then, either
(a) for any j, [ω]j = [ω′]j , but this means that plE (ω′)= plE (ω) since they exactly
falsify the same set of defaults, or
(b) there exists an index i such that, ∀j > i, [ω]j = [ω′]j and neither [ω]i ⊃ [ω′]i
nor [ω′]i ⊃ [ω]i .
In case (2b), we define belE that satisfies the two following conditions (given by















εji >∞ εsi for all dsi /∈∆(ω′, i).
Then using exactly the proof of Lemma 12(2b), we get plE (ω′) >∞ plE (ω). 2
Lemma 13. Let >∆ be an admissible preference relation on ∆, and (Ω,>Ω,∆,>∆) be
an admissible prioritized structure. Then, for any ω and ω′ in Ω,ω >Ω ω′ if and only if ω
is belE -preferred to ω′ for any belE in Bel⊕(∆,>∆).
Proof. Recall that, for any ω in Ω , we have plE (ω) ≈∞ tω , where tω is given by (8)
(Section 5.1). We denote by ∆ω the set of defaults in ∆ such that ω falsifies d . For any ω




{εi | di ∈∆L} ·
∏
{εi | di ∈∆C},
plE (ω′)≈∞
∏
{εj | εj ∈∆R} ·
∏
{εj | dj ∈∆C}.
(⇒) Assume that ω >Ω ω′. As (Ω,>Ω,∆,>∆) is an admissible prioritized structure,
then, ω >Ω ω′ iff for each di in ∆L there exists dj in ∆R such that dj >∆ di, that is,
εi >∞ εj or equivalently, κ(εi) < κ(εj ).
Let {∆L1, . . . ,∆Lk} be a partition of ∆L such that ∆Li contains all the εij having
the same ε′i in ∆R, namely ε′i <∞ εij for j = 1, . . . , |∆Li|. Using the constraints on the
infinitesimals used to recover Geffner’s system, we also have for any i:∏
{εij | εij ∈∆i}>∞ ε′i .
Therefore:
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plE (ω)≈∞
∏
{εi | di ∈∆L} ·
∏
{εi | di ∈∆C}
⇔ plE (ω)≈∞
∏
{ε1j | ε1j ∈∆L1} · · ·
∏
{εkj | εkj ∈∆Lk} ·
∏
{εi | di ∈∆C}
⇒ plE (ω) >∞ ε′1 · · ·ε′k ·
∏
{εi | di ∈∆C} (using Lemma A.9(f))
⇒ plE (ω) >∞
∏
{ε′i | ε′i ∈∆R} ·
∏
{εi | di ∈∆C}
⇒ plE (ω) >∞ plE (ω′).
(⇐) Assume now that plE (ω) >∞ plE (ω′) holds for any belE in Bel⊕(∆,>∆), and
suppose that ω is not preferred (in the sense of Geffner) to ω′. This means that there exists
d of ∆L such that none of d ′i of ∆R satisfies d ′i > d . We proceed as in Lemma 12 by
constructing a belE which is in Bel⊕(∆,>∆) and such that plE (ω′) >∞ plE (ω). belE is
constructed such that it satisfies the three following conditions:
(1) for all d, d ′ ∈∆, if d >∆ d ′ then εd ′ >∞ εd , and
(2) for all d ′i ∈∆R, εd ′i >∞ εd , and
(3) for all d ∈∆,∏d ′ : εd ′>∞εd ε′d >∞ εd .
The added constraints (i.e., condition (2)) is consistent with the ones induced by
condition (1) since none of d ′i of ∆R satisfies d ′i > d . From these conditions we can easily
check that plE (ω′)>∞ plE (ω). Indeed,
plE (ω′)≈∞
∏
{εi | di ∈∆R} ·
∏
{εi | di ∈∆C}
>∞ εd ·
∏
{εi | di ∈∆C}
(using conditions (2) and (3) above and property A.8(c))
>∞
∏
{εi | di ∈∆R} ·
∏
{εi | di ∈∆C}. 2
Lemma 14. Let δ ∈Lout(∆) and α,β ∈ Lin(∆). Then α |∼lcd β implies α ∧ δ |∼lcd β .
Proof. We recall that In(∆) denotes the set of propositional symbols which appear in ∆
and Out(∆) = V − In(∆) denotes the set of propositional symbols which do not appear
in ∆, where V denotes the set of all propositional symbols of the language. Hence, each
interpretation ω in Ω based on V can be seen as a pair of conjuncts ω = x ∧ y , where x
is an interpretation based only on In(∆), and y is an interpretation based only on Out(∆).
Let Ωin(∆) be the set of all interpretations constructed from In(∆) and ΩOut(∆) be the set
of all interpretations constructed from Out(∆).
It is easy to check that for any x ∈Ωin(∆) and y ∈ΩOut(∆), x and x ∧ y falsify the same
set of defaults in ∆. Indeed, if x falsifies d , then x ∧ φd is inconsistent hence x ∧ y ∧ φd
is also inconsistent. The converse is also true since x ∧ φd and y are formulas built on two
disjoint sets of propositional symbols (i.e., In(∆), Out(∆)).
Therefore, for each bel an element of Bellcd, we have
pl(x)= pl(x ∧ y) for any x ∈Ωin(∆) and y ∈ΩOut(∆).
As a corollary, for any x ∈Ωin(∆) and for any A⊆ΩOut(∆) we have:
pl(x)=max{pl(x ∧ yi) | for yi ∈A}. (§)
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The proof now is trivial using the previous equalities. Indeed, for each bel an element of
Bellcd, we have:




pl(ω) | ω |= α ∧ β}>∞ max
ω′∈Ω
{




pl(x ∧ y) | x |= α ∧ β}>∞ max
ω=x ′∧y ′
{




pl(x) | x |= α ∧ β}>∞ max
ω=x ′∧y ′
{
pl(x ′) | x ′ |= α ∧¬β}








pl(x ′ ∧ y ′) | x ′ |= α ∧¬β,y ′ |= δ}




pl(ω) | ω |= α ∧ δ ∧ β}>∞ max
ω′∈Ω
{
pl(ω′) | ω′ |= α ∧ δ ∧¬β}
⇔ pl(α ∧ δ ∧ β) >∞ pl(α ∧ δ ∧¬β)
thus proving the lemma. 2
Lemma 15. If α ∧ Free(∆∪ {α}) |= β then α |∼lcd β .
Proof. First, we define α ∧ Free(∆ ∪ {α}) more precisely in terms of the so-called
minimal inconsistent subbases. A subbase A of ∆ is said to be minimally inconsistent
with respect to α iff α ∧ φA is inconsistent but for any A′ ⊂ A (strict inclusion) α ∧ φA′
is consistent. Then, we let Free(∆ ∪ {α}) = {d |6 ∃dA ⊂ ∆, d ∈ A and A is a minimal
inconsistent subbase of∆}. To prove our thesis, now, it is enough to prove that each lcd-bel-
preferred model of α satisfies α ∧ Free(∆∪ {α}). We reason by contradiction, and assume
that we have an interpretation ω which is an lcd-bel-preferred model of α but falsifies
α∧Free(∆∪{α}). Let∆ω = α∧ (∧ω|=d and d∈∆ φd ). Since formulas of Free(∆∪{α}) are
free from inconsistencies, then ∆ω ∧ Free(∆ ∪ {α}) is consistent. That is, there exists an
interpretation ω′ that satisfies∆ω∧Free(∆∪{α}). By using Lemma 7 we can easily check
that this ω′ is bel-preferred to ω, thus contradicting our assumption. 2
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